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AN AMERICA'S CUP FOR TORT 
REFORM? AUSTRALIA AND 
AMERICA COMPARED 
Jeffrey O'Connell* and David Partlett** 
The issue of tort reform has descended from Ivory Towers to 
populist politics. A few years ago no one could have predicted 
that "tort reform" would become political argot and a stirring 
election slogan. Some in the United States see the tort crisis and 
the stimulus for reform as somehow uniquely American.1 This 
Article shows instead that many advanced, industrialized socie-
ties are discussing tort reform initiatives actively. The precise 
nature of the problems, the reasons for reform, and the shape of 
solutions will be fashioned by indigenous culture, tradition, and 
the uncertainties of politics. In the common-law world, however, 
a number of countries are sufficiently similar to provide valuable 
mutual lessons. 
The importance of tort reform suggests that decision makers 
take a wider, comparative viewpoint. Through comparison, we 
may better understanq our own dilemmas and the reasons for 
them. Moreover, the operation of reforms in other common-law 
countries may be transplanted successfully to the United States. 
This Article addresses those people, primarily in the United 
States and Australia, who are interested in these matters of legal 
change. Both countries can learn lessons that may aid in the 
choice of appropriate roads to reform. 2 
• John Allan Love Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. B.A., 
Dartmouth College, 1951; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1954. 
•• Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. LL.B, University of Syd-
ney, 1971; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1974; S.J.D., University of Virginia, 1980. 
Thanks are to Eric Szweda, Class of 1990, for research assistance. 
1. See Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 
1521 (1987) [hereinafter Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis]; Priest, The Monsanto 
Lectures: Modern Tort Law and its Reform, 22 VAL. U.L. REV. 1 (1987); Priest, Puzzles 
of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 497 (1987). But cf. Little, Up With Torts, 24 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 861 (1987) (urging reformers to have regard for English law and 
experience). 
2. Some valuable work has appeared exposing Australian developments for American 
audiences. See DeMott, Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation, 65 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 69 (1987); Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Re-
port on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1987); 
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Part I describes the forces in tort law that have resulted in 
calls for reform. Different types of reforms have emerged, and 
foreign reforms vary. We argue that those most worthy of exami-
nation have been developed in countries with similar political 
and legal traditions. The initiatives, wrong turns, and failings of 
American and Australian lawmakers should be of particular mu-
tual interest. The formulation of a catalog of goals is an essential 
task in thinking about reform. 3 
Part II provides an introduction to Australian endeavors. We 
seek to explain both the willingness of Australia to consider far-
reaching reform and the reasons why the Australian reform has, 
in its implementation, disappointed expectations. The reforms 
now adopted in the states of Victoria, South Australia, and, 
most recently, New South Wales are closely examined. The New 
South Wales reforms are particularly noteworthy, because the 
legislatiqn enacted against a background of recommendations by 
the New South Wales Law Reform Commission set forth a well-
reasoned and vigorous case for abolition of the common law and 
replacement by a state-organized compensation scheme. 
Part III proposes a positive program for reform. Considering 
political and theoretical objections to, on the one hand, statist 
reform and, on the other, ad hoc and piecemeal change, we pre-
sent an elective no-fault scheme that borrows from both contrac-
tual and legislative guises. This suggestion builds on a body of 
scholarship and practical reforms propounded by the senior au-
thor." Part III tests the adaptability of elective no-fault to the 
Australian context. We conclude that these elective no-fault 
schemes fit comfortably and have a number of advantages over 
the currently existing common-law situation and over other pro-
posed reforms. 
In the end, we hope to convey to the reader the value of a 
wider vantage point in the present tort debate. Comparative 
work tempered by an appreciation of differences in social and 
Levin, Equal Educational Opportunity for Children with Special Needs: The Federal 
Role in Australia, 48 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1985, at 213. 
3. See Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 603 
(1973) (setting forth desiderata of a compensation scheme); infra notes 31-38 and accom-
panying text. 
4. See, e.g., O'Connell, A Neo No-Fault Contract In Lieu of Tort: Preaccident_ Guar· 
antees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898 (1985); O'Connell, An 
Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No Fault Insurance for Many Kinds 
of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501 (1976) [hereinafter O'Connell, An Alternative to Aban-
doning Tort Liability]. 
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political conditions may well lead us to make more informed, 
balanced, and humane decisions in restructuring tort law.11 
I. COMMON LAW TORT REFORM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
The law of torts has changed remarkably over the last thirty-
five years. From a narrow, private law focus, tort law has 
achieved high public and political profile. With this have come 
calls for reform, sometimes grafted upon the extant law, and at 
other times, demands for more radical schemes. Appropriate re-
form requires a careful articulation of the goals of that reform, 
strengthened by an appreciation of the relevant overseas 
experiments. 
A. The Challenge and Pattern of Tort Reform 
Torts scholars should be resting uneasily in their beds. Tort 
law is complex and exciting and, at the same time, perplexing 
and worrying. The potency of the law of negligence has induced 
tort liability to protect new interests: the law of torts has in-
vaded the domain of contract law.6 The overt instrumental goals 
5. Markesinis, An Expanding Tort Law-The Price of a Rigid Contract Law, 103 
LAW Q. REV. 354, 396 (1987) (a "cri de coeur" on the "practical and theoretical [need] to 
apply the method of exegesis and comparison to relatively narrow and manageable 
problems"); Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 LAW Q. REV. 79 (1976) (dis-
cussing comparative law technique). One commentator has remarked: 
The high rate of social change prevalent or aimed at in nearly all contemporary 
societies seriously challenges the skills and abilities of statesmen, lawyers and 
social scientists .... This is one of the more significant areas where the com-
parative social study of law can make a significant contribution to the solution of 
social problems. 
Dror, Law and Social Change, 33 TuL. L. REV. 787, 802 (1959). The law of torts is a 
product of complex legal, social, historical, and economic factors. See ABA SPECIAL 
COMM. ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CON-
TINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW (1984); 
Whitman, A "Humanitarian" Approach to Individual Injury, 79 MICH. L. REv. 762 
(1981). For a view on the political dimension of tort law, see Zacharias, The Politics of 
Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698 (1986). 
6. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). For judicial concern that con-
tract law should not "drown in a sea of tort," see East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica 
Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866, 871 (1986). See also Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negli-
gently Infl.icted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985) (describ-
ing the boundaries and rationale of tort recovery); Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic 
Loss, and the Privity Requirement: Once More Into the Void, 67 B.U.L. REV. 9 (1987). In 
Australia, the seminal High Court decision is Caltex Oil Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willem-
stad," 136 C.L.R. 529 (Aust!. 1976). 
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in tort law encourage courts to grant compensation on a wide 
scale by way of third-party liability insurance to the victims of 
accidents and misfortunes.7 Mass and toxic tort litigation in-
volve occurrences far beyond the original focus of the 
law-namely, simple interaction between two, or at least among 
very few, parties. This expansion in the scope of tort law by it-
self significantly weakens any argument that tort law is merely 
private law.8 In truth, tort law has thrown off any pretense that 
it is purely a regime of private law and has been revealed as 
public law. In other words, most scholars regard tort law, on the 
whole, as a form of public regulation. Professionals' conduct, for 
example, is molded not only by extensive regulatory licensing, 
but also by common-law tort liability rules.9 Also, industry must 
try to conform its practices to the discipline of products liability 
law in addition to that of complex regulatory regimes.10 
Although the public-law face of tort law has not always been 
apparent, it has been present since the Industrial Revolution 
made human lives more interdependent. Nineteenth century 
courts saw that liability rules attaching to workers and their em-
ployers influenced the cost of production. Whether one accepts 
or rejects the thesis that the defenses of common employment, 
contributory negligence, and voluntary assumption of risk subsi-
dized the growth of industry, liability rules undoubtedly im-
posed costs. 11 This development revealed the public character of 
liability in the industrial setting, which in turn facilitated the 
7. For insightful discussions, see G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY (1980); Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the 
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). 
8. See J. THOMPSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 224 
(W. Parent ed. 1986); Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The 
Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 883-906 (1987); Rosenberg, The 
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984). But see Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis": A Reassess-
ment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765 (1987) (suggesting 
that tort law exists primarily to resolve disputes); Weinrib, The Insurance Justification 
and Private Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 681, 686 (1985) (arguing that tort law continues to 
have coherence only from the viewpoint of corrective justice). See generally McGovern, 
Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 
440 (1986) (analyzing new case management techniques). 
9. See D. PARTLETT, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE (1985). 
10. See Reuter, Designing Safer Products: Corporate Responses to Product Liability 
Law and Regulation, 7 J. PROD. LtAB. 263 (1984). For a discussion of the comparative 
efficacy of liability rules and regulation, see Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regula-
tion of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984). 
11. See Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). But cf. 
Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth Century America: A Reinterpreta-
tion, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981); Note, Private Law and Public Policy: Negligence Law 
and Political Change in Nineteenth-Century North Carolina, 66 N.C.L. REV. 421 (1988). 
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subsequent enactment of workers' compensation no-fault legisla-
tion throughout the Western world. 12 Some observers at the time 
perceived this public character in other areas of tort law and 
reasoned that the no-fault pattern would find acceptance for ac-
cidents generally.13 Large tracts of tort law, however, continued 
to possess a private-law appearance. 
The history of the reform of tort law has been punctuated 
with reforms-some accepted, others rejected-where various 
spheres of the law's operation were seen as possessing sufficient 
public character to call for public regulation. For example, inju-
ries arising out of the operation of motor vehicles came to be 
regarded as not merely a matter for vindication of rights be-
tween individuals. The use of motor vehicles caused many acci-
dents and required compensation, quite apart from tort law, for 
accident victims. The magnitude of the problem required recog-
nition of its public character and eventuated in a public resolu-
tion in favor of no-fault legislation.14 
Present day tort scholars are condemned to restless nights be-
cause the judicial muscle and imagination that expanded liabil-
ity to govern technological risks also has exposed a serious pub-
lic policy nerve. From a public policy viewpoint, we must ask 
whether the multifaceted judicial task can reach prompt, ade-
quate, and acceptable conclusions. More concretely, the courts 
applying the law of torts pursue diverse goals of compensation 
and deterrence, goals accomplished in an individualized and 
haphazard way.1~ Attorneys represent individuals, or classes of 
individuals, in adversarial proceedings generating both consider-
able costs and unreliable information upon which courts must 
ground their conclusions. Juries, if matters go that far, balance 
the costs and benefits crudely. Issues of product design and 
technological risk seem inappropriate for a common-law system 
designed at its inception for the resolution of more mundane ac-
cident interactions. 16 In economic terms, the error costs of the 
12. See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916); J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF 
TORTS 495-97 (7th ed. 1987); see also Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic 
Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775 (1982). 
13. See Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235 (1914). 
14. U.S.- DEP'T OF TRANSP., MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 94-100, 128-32, 138-39, 143-46 (1971). 
15. See Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North 
American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 929 (1987) (pointing to the impossibility of the tort system's performing 
the tasks of promoting socially optimal insurance (compensation) and deterrence objec-
tives simultaneously). 
16. See J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, THE BLAME GAME: INJURIES, INSURANCE, AND INJUS-
TICE 97-105 (1986); Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design 
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common-law system are inordinate.17 The adaptability of the 
common law to even approach within cannon shot the resolution 
of modern day tort problems speaks volumes for its strengths. 
But the common-law approach is like the panda's thumb: it per-
forms tasks but does so inefficiently. If we could design a panda, 
we might give it a more useful thumb. 18 Because we have some 
power to design tort liability rules, we should attempt to formu-
late and establish a more efficient system.19 
Reform suggestions have come in different forms. The most 
recent suggestion attempts to ameliorate the symptoms of the 
malfunctioning tort system. 20 We may refer to this approach as 
the "ad hoc" phenomenon. This new wave of tort reform propos-
als reacts to costly or unavailable insurance. This reform limits 
levels of damages, proscribes punitive damages, modifies rules of 
contribution between tortfeasors and collateral benefits, and reg-
ulates contingency fees. 21 These reforms are designed to reduce 
the level of tort litigation and hence minimize exposure of per-
sons to tort liability. The widespread acceptance of this type of 
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 CoLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973); Huber, Safety and 
the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 277 (1985). 
17. Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1139, 1148 
(1987); Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799, 806-13 
(1983). 
18. The metaphor comes from Elliot, Managerial Judging in the Evolution of Proce-
dure, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 306, 306-07 (1986). 
19. See Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. Cm. L. 
REV. 184 (1987) (giving perspectives on initiatives). 
20. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
MEDICAL LIABILITY AND MALPRACTICE 121-35 (1987); U.S. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, 
REPORT ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN IN-
SURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986); O'Connell, A Correct Diagnosis of the 
Ills of Liability Insurance as a False Cure: A Comment on the Reports of the Federal 
Tort Policy Working Group, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 161 (1988); Priest, The Current 
Insurance Crisis, supra note 1. 
21. For example, the recent Alabama reform included: Act of June 11, 1987, No. 183, 
§ 3, 1987 Ala. Acts 245, 245 (codified at ALA. CODE § 6-11-3 (Supp. 1988)) (authorizing 
periodic payments in civil actions that result in damage awards); Act of June 11, 1987, 
No. 184, §§ 1-4, 6, 1987 Ala. Acts 249, 249 (codified at ALA. CoDE § 12-21-12 (Supp. 
1988)) (abolishing "scintilla" rule and instead requiring that "substantial evidence" shall 
be the burden of proof in civil law suits); Act of June 11, 1987, No. 185, §§ 1-2, 8, 1987 
Ala. Acts 251, 251 (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 6-11-20, -21, -27 (Supp. 1988)) (requiring 
that punitive damages may be awarded only where clear and convincing evidence is 
proved and providing for a cap on such damages; limiting liability of principal for puni-
tive damages for acts committed by agent); Act of June 11, 1987, No. 186, §§ 1-4, 1987 
Ala. Acts 254, 254 (codified at ALA. CODE§§ 12-19-270 to -273 (Supp. 1988)) (authorizing 
courts to assess court costs and attorneys' fees in frivolous civil actions); see also FLOR-
IDA'S ACADEMIC TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS, FINAL 
RECOMMENDATIONS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF 1988 (1988) [hereinafter FLORIDA'S 
TASK FORCE, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS REPORT]. 
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reform attests to its political appeal. Such reform gives a legisla-
ture the appearance of responding to a crisis by virtue of its in-
dividual rhetorical appeal, yet in fact leaves the common law a 
little enfeebled. On closer examination, this legislation works un-
fairly to the advantage of the powerful groups recommending it 
and, more importantly, may adversely affect those who most de-
serve and need compensation. 22 It may also significantly under-
mine the deterrence function of the law.23 
A second type of tort law reform manifests itself as a type of 
pressure valve. This reform provides for a compensation scheme 
under which victims of accidents falling within certain classes 
are compensated on a no-fault basis. Common-law liability is 
left in place. 24 The efficacy of this reform has been tested in the 
area of industrial accidents in England and Australia. In both 
England and Australia, a worker injured in the course of his em-
ployment may obtain no-fault benefits under workers' compen-
sation legislation and also sue the employer for common-law 
damages. Particularly in Australia, where the laws are more gen-
erous in granting workers' compensation benefits than in Eng-
land, the courts have been conservative in expanding the scope 
of common-law liability.211 This development contrasts starkly 
with motor vehicle cases where proof of fault has become highly 
attenuated over the years. More recent suggestions for reform in 
22. J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, supra note 16, at 97-105; see Wade, An Evaluation of 
the "Insurance Crisis" and Existing Tort Law, 24 Hous. L. REV. 81 (1987); see also Fein 
v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 167-78, 695 P.2d 665, 687-95, 211 Cal. 
Rptr. 368, 390-97 (1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). 
23. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 154-57 (1986). Abolishing the collat-
eral source rule may allow the potential tortfeasor to avoid the full cost of his negligent 
actions, and hence negligent actions will be engaged in at a greater than optimal level. 
For criticism of the rule, see Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Contract Dam-
ages, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 56 (1986). 
24. For a discussion of add-on, no-fault auto laws and the (expensive) experience 
under them, see O'Connell & Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-
Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REV. 61 (1986). For more on the comparative expansion of 
first party coverage payable without reference to fault and the effect of no-fault insur-
ance on tort liability claims, see O'Connell & Baker, Compensation for Injury & Illness: 
An Update of the Conard-Morgan Tabulations, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 913 (1986); O'Connell & 
Guinivan, An Irrational Combination: The Relative Expansion of Liability Insurance 
and Continuation of Loss Insurance, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. (1988) (forthcoming). 
25. Atiyah, Res lpsa Loquitur in England and Australia, 35 Moo. L. REV. 337 (1972) 
(contrasting the strict Australian view of res ipsa loquitur with the English view). En-
glish courts have more willingly relaxed the rigors of this system because of the relatively 
lower no-fault benefit obtainable under the applicable workers' compensation. See Mc-
Ghee v. National Coal Bd., (1972) 3 All E.R. 1008 (H.L.) (adopting a probabilistic causa-
tion model). But c.f. Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Health Auth., (1987] 1 App. Cas. 750 
(H.L.) (division among their Lordships on probabilistic causation as it applies to a loss of 
chance). 
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this area attempt to build mechanisms to encourage resort to the 
compensation fund rather than to the exercise of the right to sue 
at common law.26 These schemes refine the add-on, no-fault au-
tomobile schemes that were created in the late sixties and early 
seventies throughout much of the common-law world.27 
A third variation recognizes the dominant public law character 
of tort and, to a greater or lesser extent, substitutes a right to 
recover against a public fund for the claim in tort. The apotheo-
sis of this reform is the New Zealand National Compensation 
Scheme, which expunges the right to claim at common law for 
personal injury and, in lieu thereof, creates a right to obtain no-
fault compensation from a state-administered fund. 28 This 
scheme broadens the availability of compensation to victims of 
accidents, abandoning the so-called "forensic lottery." At the 
same time, the scheme reduces the cost of receiving compensa-
tion. No provision is made for full common-law compensation. 
In keeping with a socially administered scheme, the level of eco-
nomic losses is restricted, and, with limited exceptions, 
noneconomic losses-pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of 
life-are excluded. 
Note that, in a measure, this reform maintains its tort link by 
basing compensation payments on lost income, though it im-
poses a cap. This places the reform at odds with the conception 
of a social welfare scheme based upon needs and reflects a fear 
that significant deterrence through internalization of the costs of 
accidents is lost once the link between action and extent of in-
jury is broken. The third party insurance heritage may also be 
perceived. The well-paid, who pose the greatest actuarial risk to 
the fund, pay the same premium as the less wealthy. In this way, 
the poor subsidize the wealthy. The scheme also reflects its torts 
roots by compensating for accidents. Critics point out that a 
26. Feinberg, The Toxic Tort Litigation Crisis: Conceptual Problems and Proposed 
Solutions, 24 Hous. L. REV. 155, 167-74 (1987) (discussing reforms that would encourage 
out-of-court settlement). The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 201, 300aa to 300aa-33), provides 
no-fault compensation for economic losses and sets a maximum of $250,000 for pain and 
suffering. Payments are made out of a government-sponsored compensation fund. A 
plaintiff seeking vindication under common law faces a defense· that the vaccine was 
accompanied' by an adequate warning complying with FDA regulations. 
27. See O'Connell & Joost, supra note 24; see also the former Victorian add-on auto 
no-fault scheme, Motor Accidents Act, 1973 Viet. Acts 8429. 
28. For a description of the New Zealand Accident Compensation Act of 1972, see G. 
PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY 63-130 (1979). The legislation followed the re-
port, ROYAL COMMISSION TO INQUIRE INTO AND REPORT UPON WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
(1967). For criticism, see Henderson, The New Zealand Accident Compensation Reform, 
48 U. Cm. L. REV. 781 (1981). 
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compensation scheme should not only include victims of acci-
dents but also victims of illness and other misfortunes. A recent 
monumental English study shows that illness rather than acci-
dents accounts for most of the personal economic dislocation 
arising from disabilities. 29 
The menu of possible reforms does not end here. Elective no-
fault has been proposed that could be implemented with or 
without legislative intervention. 30 This scheme builds upon the 
second type of reform identified above. For present purposes, it 
is enough to note that this reform leaves the common law in 
place but forecloses or limits resort to it in the event that timely 
no-fault compensation is offered. This reform, with its emphasis 
upon individual choice making, has distinct advantages. These 
advantages over other suggested reforms are both theoretical 
and, in terms of political acceptability, practical. 
B. The Dilemma of Choice 
A smorgasbord is arrayed before those concerned with ques-
tions of tort reform. We may select dishes ranging from modest 
tinkering to complete overthrow. The difficulty of choosing and 
then implementing reform should not be underestimated. Al-
though the Rand Corporation, among others, has contributed 
valuable work, a thorough knowledge of the dimensions of the 
problem is still a distant goal. 31 Even as new dimensions of the 
problem are revealed, the reformer must guard against nirvana 
29. D. HARRIS, M. MACLEAN, H. GENN, S. LLOYD-BOSTOCK, P. FENN, P. CoRFIELD & Y. 
BRITTAN, COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY (1984). For a proposed 
American study along the same lines, see 52 Fed. Reg. 27,724 (1987). The grant for the 
study has been made to the Rand Corporation. See generally J. STAPLETON, DISEASE AND 
THE COMPENSATION DEBATE 142-57 (1986) (criticizing the arbitrariness of the common law 
in stopping short of compensating for misfortunes beyond those arising from accidents); 
Abel, The Real Tort Crisis: Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443 (1987) -(arguing that 
the tort system fails to compensate needy victims); Abraham, Principle and Pragmatism 
in the Compensation Debate, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 302 (1987) (criticizing Stapleton). 
For more on this fundamental debate, see COMMONWEALTH OF AusTL., ATTORNEY GEN.'s 
DEP'T, PERSONAL COMPENSATION FOR INJURY: PROCEEDINGS OF A SEMINAR 93-118 (J. Davis 
& D. Partlett eds.) (Australian National University, Aug. 17-19, 1985) [hereinafter PER-
SONAL COMPENSATION FOR INJURY). 
30. See infra notes 143-82 and accompanying text. 
31. For a review of the work of the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice, see 
THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST SEVEN PROGRAM YEARS: 
APRIL 1980 - MARCH 1987 (1987); see also U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MAL· 
PRACTICE: CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984 (1987). A useful state survey is 
FLORIDA'S TASK FORCE, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS REPORT, supra note 21. For one attempt 
to use the available data systematically, see Priest, supra note 7. 
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fallacy. 32 The real world of torts with all its warts cannot be 
compared with the idealized reformed world. 33 Reformers must 
therefore meet a considerable burden of predicting the cost that 
may be generated by their reforms. The greater the degree of 
reform, the more difficult prediction becomes. Reformers must 
also be aware of political stumbling blocks to change. Here, 
again, the more significant the reform, the greater the resistance. 
Powerful constituencies contend: insurers, industries, labor un-
ions, the welfare lobby, and lawyers. They speak strongly and 
form disparate viewpoints in the political fora. One may expect 
reform, then, to resemble a crazy quilt of compromise as it 
emerges from this Babel. 
This dilemma should leave reformers to somber reflection. In 
particular, we regard as an essential starting point the articula-
tion of objectives of any reform. Fifteen years ago, Professor 
(now Judge) Robert Keeton recognized the desirability of gener-
alized objectives that a "good compensation system might 
serve."34 He saw that a consequence would be to "identify con-
sensus. "36 It seems useful then to list the desiderata of any sys-
tem that may attract a fair degree of consensus, and then to 
measure reform proposals against those desiderata. The objec-
tives proposed by Keeton, in our opinion, form a useful starting 
point. 
First, a good system of compensation will be equitable, 
and it will be so from each of three different perspec-
tives-between those who receive its benefits and those 
who bear the burden of its costs, among different benefi-
ciaries, and among different cost-bearers. 
Second, the system will contribute to the protection, 
enhancement, and wise allocation of society's human and 
economic resources. 
Third, the system will compensate promptly. It will 
meet economic burdens as they occur, and it will provide 
for medical and other rehabilitative services as they are 
needed. 
32. Cf. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1272 
(1982) (providing a similar warning in respect to corporate law regulation). 
33. One should be aware of the tendentious quality of the debate on both sides. Re-
ports favoring change avoid possible pitfalls of reform, and those espousing the status 
quo often turn a blind eye to present shortcomings. The conservative presumption of 
maintaining the status quo with its known costs has considerable power when the costs 
of adjustment to change are considered. 
34. Keeton, supra note 3, at 600. 
35. Id. at 602. 
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Fourth, the system will be reliable. It will give assur-
ance of financial responsibility for the payment of com-
pensation determined to be due, and the determinations 
of entitlement to benefits and responsibility for costs will 
be predictable. 
Fifth, the system will distribute losses rather than im-
pose or leave crushing burdens on individuals. 
Sixth, the system will be efficient, minimizing waste 
and overhead. 
Seventh, the system will avoid inducements and, if fea-
sible, provide affirmative deterrents to antisocially risky 
conduct. 
Eighth, the system will minimize inducements to exag-
geration and fraud and opportunities for profit from such 
conduct. This is essential to the integrity and equity of 
the system and to cost control as well. 36 
453 
With this template for consideration of reform proposals, by 
what means may reformers reach a conclusion on each of the 
eight grounds?37 A significant scholarly tradition on this point 
has grown in the United States. Theoretical and empirical work 
has enriched our appreciation of the issues.38 This Article sug-
gests that an instructive source for reformers in the United 
States is found in initiatives adopted and proposed in differing 
legal systems. 
C. Foreign Patterns of Reform 
We have already mentioned the New Zealand reform and 
some proposed expansions upon it. As momentum for reform 
gathers, we expect that other models may also be usefully ex-
amined.39 Such work must account for the dangers as well as the 
benefits of comparative work. Models adopted elsewhere may ill 
36. Id. at 603. 
37. We are inclined to assure the reader that the coincidence of the number eight 
with the Buddha's eightfold path does not clothe the aims with any transcendental qual-
ities beyond their own merit. For an introductory discussion of the Buddha's eightfold 
path, see G. PARRINDER, A DICTIONARY OF NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS 204 (2d ed. 1981). 
38. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS: A FoL-
LOW UP REPORT ON No-FAULT AuTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCES (1985); Robinson, The Med-
ical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospectiue, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., 
Spring 1986, at 5. 
39. See, e.g., Hellner, Compensation for Personal Injury: The Swedish Alternatiue, 
34 AM. J. COMP. L. 613 (1986). 
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fit the American or Australian foot. Some European civil law 
countries, for example, arguably have done more to bring the 
law of accidents within a framework of the social insurance sys-
tem. One may speculate that the legal, bureaucratic, or adminis-
trative culture of those countries facilitated that reform. Eng-
land is a notable European exception in its failure to adopt tort-
law reform. •0 
The common-law tradition exerts a considerable independent 
pressure inhibiting reform. Tort law has, at its base, a strong 
individualistic, liberal premise that seems to enjoy a broad social 
acceptance. 41 Although it is useful to look at reforms in civil law 
countries, it may therefore be more enlightening to focus on de-
velopments in those countries possessmg a common-law 
tradition. 
This fact perhaps explains the fascination with the New Zea-
land reform. Undoubtedly a country strongly in the camp of the 
common law, New Zealand has nonetheless adopted a far-reach-
ing reform in abolishing the common law of torts and replacing 
it with a right for the victims of accidents to claim from a fund 
established by the state.42 Much may be gained from an exami-
nation of the New Zealand National Compensation Scheme, a 
reform that needs even further study. However, some significant 
differences may make the reform a less apposite point of com-
parison. New Zealand is accustomed to planned social experi-
ment; it had established the rudiments of a welfare state well 
before most others of the Wes tern world.43 Its population is ho-
40. In the United Kingdom, a commission studying liability and compensation rec-
ommended relatively interstitial reform of the common-law system. ROYAL CoMM'N ON 
CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY. REPORT, 1978 CMND. 7054. 
One insightful way to view the differences between countries is in terms of general 
legal societal types-gemeinschaft, gesellschaft, and a third, the bureaucratic-administra-
tive society. See Kamenka & Tay, Social Traditions, Legal Traditions, in LAw AND So-
CIAL CONTROL 3, 5, 6-26 (E. Kamenka & A. Tay eds. 1980). 
41. See J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) (explicating liberal theory in a 
democratic society); P. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 240-42 
(1982) (suggesting that it was largely the classical liberalism of America that inhibited 
the acceptance of significant state involvement in health care, when other western but 
less classically liberal states, like Germany, had accepted a state role in the late nine-
teenth century). 
42. See generally, A. BLAIR, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION IN NEw ZEALAND (1978); T. lsoN, 
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: A COMMENTARY ON THE NEW ZEALAND SCHEME (1980); Brown, 
Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 976 
(1985); Gaskins, Tort Reform in the Welfare State: The New Zealand Compensation 
Act, 18 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 238 (1980). 
43. See Tampke, Bismarck's Social Legislation: A Genuine Breakthrough?, in THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE WELFARE STATE IN BRITAIN AND GERMANY 1850-1950, at 71, 81-82 (W. 
Mommsen ed. 1981). 
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mogeneous and well-educated. A politically unitary state with a 
strong tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, it has a highly 
egalitarian political ethos. Income is relatively evenly distrib-
uted. 0 It is not heavily industrialized, having depended largely 
upon efficient primary economic activity, especially agriculture. 
In most of these respects, New Zealand differs markedly from 
the United States and even Australia. 
Ironically, comparative models more worthy of attention in 
the United States generally have been neglected. Reformers 
. should turn to reform suggestions and implementation of these 
suggestions in Australia or Canada. Like the United States, both 
nations have federal structures.411 Their populations, although 
smaller than the United States, exceed considerably that of New 
Zealand.46 They have experienced significant post-World War II 
immigration from Southern and Western Europe and Asia, giv-
ing them an ethnic diversity resembling the United States.47 
They have a proportionally large industrial base. Their legal tra-
ditions go beyond that of the common law. Both have a tradition 
of constitutional government including judicial review of legisla-
tive action.48 Their systems possess formal and informal checks 
and balances, inhibiting overreaching legislative action. In other 
words, in contrast to New Zealand, and like the United States, 
parliamentary sovereignty is confined in Australia and Canada. 49 
44. 1 C. TAYLOR & D. JODJCE, WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS: 
CROSS-NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND RATES OF CHANGE 135 (2d ed. 1983); cf. Ahluwalia, Ine-
quality, Poverty and Development, 3 J. DEV. EcoN. 307 (1976) (surveying income distri-
bution in 60 countries). 
45. See generally C. Gilbert, Australian and Canadian Federalism, 1867-1984: A 
Study of Judicial Techniques (1986); J. MAGNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA: CASES, 
NOTES, AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1985); P. LANE, A MANUAL OF AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (3d ed. 1984); L. ZINES, THE HIGH COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1981). 
46. In 1986, Australia was estimated to have a population of 16 million, Canada had a 
population of 25.5 million, and New Zealand had a population of 3.26 million. 1 COUN-
TRIES OF THE WORLD AND THEIR LEADERS YEARBOOK, at 210, 346, 898 (1988) [hereinafter 
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD). 
47. For comments on the decreasing percentage of persons of British extraction in 
Australia and resulting growth in ethnic diversity, see A. BANKS & W. OVERSTREET, Po-
LITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD 514 (1981); COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 46, at 
210; Blainey, Australia: A Bird's-Eye View, 114 DAEDALUS, Winter 1985, at 1, 24-26. 
48. See supra note 45. 
49. We make no attempt to take account of Canadian developments in this Article. 
Our task, rather, is to describe Australian initiatives so that experience of reform may be 
more accessible to Americans. For discussions of Canadian law, see Hutchinson, Beyond 
No Fault, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 755 (1985); Ison, The Politics of Reform in Personal Injury 
Compensation, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 385 (1977); McLaren, The Theoretical and Policy 
Challenges in Canadian Compensation Law, 23 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 609 (1985); 
O'Connell & Tenser, North America's Most Ambitious No-Fault Law: Quebec's Auto 
Insurance Act, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917 (1987); Trebilcock, supra note 15. Recently the 
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II. TORT REFORM IN AUSTRALIA 
In Australia, tort reformers-parliamentarians and lawyers, 
both academic and practicing-have engaged in a robust debate 
about desirable measures to alter or reshape the liability system. 
This debate alone, with its slightly different presuppositions of 
government's role in society, is worthy of consideration in the 
United States. But more, the debate has finally precipitated 
statutory reform, the outlines and impact of which are highly 
relevant in the current debate in the United States. We under-
take to describe these matters and give an assessment of the 
strengths, weaknesses, and political idiosyncrasies of the Austra-
lian developments. 
A. Of the Australian Tort Reform Ship, Its Crew, and 
Political Rocks 
At the outset, a caveat: In many ways, Americans should find 
the Australian initiatives relevant in thinking about the Ameri-
can reform agenda. Legislative action of planned reform, how-
ever, does not fit so easily with the American political and eco-
nomic psyche. The United States was born in the libertarian age 
that lionized individual freedom; Australia was born in the 
Benthamite age that sanctified rational utilitarian planning.110 In 
this respect, the United States possesses the genes of the eight-
eenth century, Australia of the nineteenth century. Americans 
are leery of legislative intervention; Australians are much more 
accepting of it. Compensation schemes thus appear more natural 
on the Australian political landscape. In spite of this, the tort 
reform drive in the United States has a Benthamite character: 
the greater social good is to follow from legislative strictures on 
the common law. If Bentham, within this narrow sphere, has 
come of age in the United States, we are encouraged to take re-
formers to a place that Bentham has dominated. If such reform 
falters in Australia, it appears much more chimerical in the 
United States. 
Australian tort law does not face problems of the same degree 
as United States tort law. Superficial reasons may be cited. 
Province of Ontario has evinced strong interest in implementing the elective no-fault 
auto insurance scheme presented in O'Connell & Joost, supra note 24. 
50. For an excellent exposition of this heritage, see Collins, Political Ideology in Aus-
tralia: The Distinctiveness of a Benthamite Society, 114 DAEDALUS, Winter 1985, at 147. 
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Strict liability for defective products has never been accepted.111 
Incentives to litigate are suppressed because contingency fees 
are unethical, and losing litigants must bear part of the success-
ful party's costs, including attorneys' fees. Juries are relatively 
rare; most cases proceed before a single judge. Also, Australian 
courts, in contrast to the English and American, have been re-
luctant to ease the burden of proof of causation.112 Punitive ex-
emplary damages are available only for intentional torts and 
even then only on a finding of contumelious disregard of the 
plaintiff's rights. 113 On the cultural level, the vindication of rights 
through litigation is not ingrained in Australian attitudes. The 
absence of a constitutional bill of rights has dampened the 
courts' role in the protection of individual rights.114 Again in 
Benthamite fashion, the courts show a distinct deference to the 
legislature in delineating new regimes for protection of rights. 1111 
Within this defendant's pleasure dome, at least in relative 
terms, how did the demand for tort reform arise? In contrast to 
the demand for tort reform in the United States, the demand in 
Australia did not arise out of impossibly high insurance premi-
ums or lack of available coverage. It sprang rather from a view 
that a more efficient system of compensation would release 
funds which could be more equitably spread to the victims of 
accidents that inevitably occur in modern industrialized socie-
ties. At the same time, the promise of reduced compulsory exac-
tions to fund the scheme evoked more mercenary sympathies. 
The post-World War II generation of Australian and English le-
gal scholars proposed these views from an overt social welfare 
51. Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 A.C. 562, and Australian Knitting Mills Ltd. v. 
Grant, 50 C.L.R. 387 (Aust!. 1933), continue to rule as foundation negligence cases. How-
ever, the prospect of legislation imposing strict liability looms. The Australian Law Re-
form Commission has received a reference from the Attorney General to report on the 
desirability of legislative reform for defective products. In the United Kingdom, E.E.C. 
guidelines on product liability have obliged reform to a strict liability regime. For com-
ments, see Stapleton, Products Liability Reform-Real or Illusory?, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 392 (1986). 
52. For the English view, see supra note 25. For the Australian view, see Tubemakers 
of Australia v. Fernandez, 10 A.L.R. 303 (Aust!. 1976). 
53. Lamb v. Cotogno, 61 A.L.J.R. 549 (Aust!. 1987); Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons, 117 
C.L.R. 118 (Aust!. 1966). 
54. See South Australia v. Commonwealth, 65 C.L.R. 373 (Aust!. 1942). But the Aus-
tralian High Court has construed broadly § 92 of the Australian Constitution on inter-
state trade so as to protect some interests from state regulatory interference. 
55. Australian courts are prepared to utilize existing common law actions to protect 
liberty interests. For example, Australian courts have employed the torts of battery, as-
sault, and false imprisonment, but they have been unwilling to manufacture an action to 
protect privacy. See Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds v. Taylor, 58 C.L.R. 479 
(Aust!. 1937). 
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perspective. They perceived the tort system as a mechanism to 
provide compensation to accident victims. They then pointed 
out its inequity and arbitrariness. 56 Tort law appeared a vestige 
of another age, a curious anomaly in the modern welfare state. 
In casting it aside, post-World War II reformers focused on the 
design of schemes. They assumed that government, as society's 
agent of equity, should play the central part. More than in the 
United States, those who might have questioned the desirability 
of reform risked being branded as antediluvian or, still worse, as 
cynical supporters of the interests of trial lawyers and insurance 
companies. 
The New Zealand scheme emerged from an established South 
Seas social laboratory. Australia hailed it as an admirable model. 
Those proposing such a scheme totally dominated the intellec-
tual debate of the 1960's and early 1970's. Little coherent de-
fense of the tort system was proffered. Hence the adoption of a 
New Zealand-like scheme, perhaps even more ambitious in cov-
ering both accidents and illnesses, seemed only to await an Aus-
tralian federal government with a social welfare sympathy. In-
deed, adjustments in tor.ts courses at Australian law schools 
anticipated the development. 
The Australian Labor Party was elected to government in 
1972 with a strong platform of social change including the im-
plementation of a National Compensation Scheme. Sir Owen 
Woodhouse, a New Zealand Court of Appeals judge and the 
prime architect of the New Zealand Scheme, was invited to head 
an Australian inquiry to prepare a comprehensive report and 
draft legislation. He and his colleagues prepared a comprehen-
sive report, worthy to this day of close examination. 57 
In outline, the "Woodhouse Report" recommended a nation-
wide scheme for compensating victims of accidents and illnesses. 
It argued for abolition of the right to pursue at common law an 
action for damages for personal injury. No-fault compensation 
was to be paid on a periodic basis, calculated primarily upon the 
demonstration of lost earning capacity. Permanently incapaci-
tated employed persons presented the easiest case. They would 
receive up to eighty-five percent of their preaccident or sickness 
income. Special provisions covered the self-employed, the unem-
ployed, youths, and those performing domestic duties. Although 
56. See P. CANE, ATIYAH's AccmENTS: COMPENSATION AND THE LAW (4th ed. 1987); J. 
FLEMING, supra note 12; see also H. LUNTZ, COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION (1975). 
57. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION IN 
AUSTRALIA (1974). See generally Franklin, Personal Injury Accidents in New Zealand 
and the United States: Some Striking Similarities, 27 STAN. L. REV. 653 (1975). 
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the compensation provisions received the most prominence, the 
report also recommended new structures and funding for reha-
bilitation services and accident prevention. 
But for a quirk of Australian parliamentary and constitutional 
law and convention, American tort scholars would probably have 
had another social experiment to discuss. Like Congress in the 
United States, the Australian Parliament is bicameral; legisla-
tion must pass both the House of Representatives and the Sen-
ate. The House of Representatives, where the government by 
definition has a majority, passed legislation adopting the Wood-
house Report. Party discipline ensured the passage of govern-
ment business by a majority. In the Senate, however, the Labor 
government did not enjoy a majority. The opposition shunted 
the bill to a Senate Select Committee where it languished, not to 
be introduced before November 11, 1975, when the Governor-
General, Sir John Kerr, in an extraordinary and controversial 
decision, prorogued Parliament without advice of the govern-
ment. The bill lapsed and was not resuscitated when the opposi-
tion Liberal Party coalition handily won government in the en-
suing election. 118 
Many in Australia continued to carry a torch for tort reform.119 
The Australian Labor Party returned to power in 1983. Its plat-
form included, as an "ultimate objective," "an integrated Com-
monwealth-State nationwide scheme which ensures speedy com-
pensation at reasonable levels for all persons injured in any kind 
of accident."60 This platform embodied a legacy of skepticism 
58. For a description of these events, see G. BARWICK, SIR JOHN DID His DUTY (1983); 
J. KERR, MATTERS FOR JUDGMENT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1979). 
59. A notable proponent was Senator Gareth Evans, who later became Attorney Gen-
eral. Senator Evans had been on the faculty of law at the University of Melbourne 
School of Law. 
60. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM'N, 1 ACCIDENT COMPENSATION FINAL RE-
PORT 1: A TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS SCHEME FOR NEW SOUTH WALES 101 (1984). The Labor 
Government's platform contained, in part, the following proposals: 
It seems apparent that the common law fault principle cannot be eliminated 
in all fields overnight. Accordingly, Labor will adopt a step-by-step approach in 
which the three major problem areas-motor accidents, industrial accidents, and 
'other accidents' (including criminal, sporting and domestic injuries)-are tack-
led successively rather than all at once. · 
Labor's ultimate objective is to have an integrated Commonwealth-State na-
tionwide scheme which ensures speedy compensation at reasonable levels for all 
persons injured in any kind of accident. . .. 
As presently contemplated, the proposed Commonwealth-State model will in-
volve successive adoption of the following steps: 
(i) no-fault motor accident compensation scheme to be introduced, accompa-
nied by abolition of common law claims arising from such accidents; 
(ii) increase workers' compensation benefits under existing statutory system to 
match bench-marks set by motor accident scheme; 
460 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 21:3 
about grandiose governmental schemes left by the Whitlam La-
bor Government of the 1970's and, as a consequence, considered 
a more modest and less centralized reform program appropriate. 
The government therefore encouraged the states to introduce re-
forms on a uniform basis. Instead of a full frontal attack on the 
tort system and the immediate substitution of a state-run com-
pensation system, the government considered a staggered pro-
cess more appropriate. Initially, a transport accidents scheme 
would displace the common law in that arena. Then, a workplace 
accidents scheme would further supplant the common law. Fi-
nally, the scheme could be extended to all accidents. The times 
for the execution of a uniform cooperative scheme were propi-
tious. All the Australian states with the exception of Queensland 
and Tasmania were controlled, in the mid 1980's, by Australian 
Labor Party governments. 
It should not be assumed that all supporters of the Labor 
Party were solidly behind the efforts to reform tort law. Labor 
unions in Australia are singularly important in placing their 
powerful support behind the Labor Party. But on this issue, the 
unions were equivocal and, in some instances, hostile. 
A vital raison d'etre for unions remains the aid rendered by 
union representatives, through affiliations with law firms, to 
union members in obtaining generous compensation for injuries, 
often minor injuries. Australia's powerful trade unions feared 
that a no-fault scheme would destroy benefits fought for over a 
long period by unions. Unions naturally opposed no-fault 
schemes to the extent that they dilute the cumulative benefits 
under the common law, workers'· compensation legislation, and 
industrial awards bargained for separately. 
Common-law liability tends to overcompensate the victims of 
minor accidents. Insurance companies face heavy costs of inves-
tigation and settlement of claims that are reduced by quick and 
relatively generous compensation payments for minor injuries. 61 
Most union members will suffer minor injuries, and accordingly, 
it is very much to the advantage of the union hierarchy to en-
courage and support this system. 62 The relatively few victims of 
more serious accidents will, because of their injury, likely lose 
their employment and thus leave the union in any case. Unions 
(iii) extend workers' compensation to 24-hour-a-day cover for earners, with 
abolition of common law claims; 
(iv) 24-hour-a-day cover for non-earner non-road accident victims. 
Id. 
61. See, e.g., FLORIDA'S TASK FORCE, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS REPORT, supra note 21. 
62. 5 N.S.W. PARL. DEB. 797 (1953). 
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have secured very generous rights through bargaining, at least 
for those suffering less than catastrophic injury. Australian 
workers may not always appreciate that those of them injured 
on the job enjoy rights, in having recourse both to no-fault and 
the common law, that outstrip those of their North American 
cousins who find themselves restricted to their no-fault rights. 
But it is naive to expect that an epidemic of altruism would in-
fect unions in Australia. The formidable combination of the pro-
fessional bar and many powerful unions has had a profound in-
fluence on the reform process and its eventual product. 
B. Australian Reform 
The Australian path to tort reform has been tortuous. The 
achievement of a uniform comprehensive scheme along the lines 
of the Woodhouse Report remains distant. Some halfway houses 
have been reached in the individual states, but not in the order 
anticipated in the federal government's platform. 
1. New South Wales proposals- The government in the 
oldest state of Australia initially proposed to follow the ordained 
route in its planning. In 1981, the Attorney General of New 
South Wales called on the New South Wales Law Reform Com-
mission to inquire into, report on, and make recommendations 
concerning the adoption of a no-fault compensation scheme as a 
first step, respecting injuries arising from the use of motor vehi-
cles or other forms of transportation. The commission set forth a 
number of reasons to justify the initially limited focus on trans-
port accidents. In that kind of accident: 
1) large numbers of victims were involved and injuries 
were generally severe; 
2) current arrangements failed to give adequate com-
pensation and evoked community criticism; 
3) elsewhere in Australia, auto no-fault had been 
introduced; 
4) liability insurance was growing increasingly more 
costly; and 
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5) compensation 
ready source of 
insurance. 63 
could be made available from the 
funds already financing liability 
The Commission recommended a no-fault transport scheme that 
would abolish the common law for transport accidents. Workers' 
Compensation legislation existing at that time would remain in 
force. The Commission's Report is a very thorough document 
that articulates in detail the reasons for, and the structure of, a 
no-fault scheme.64 
The crucible of politics, however, produced a different legisla-
tive package in 1987. The state legislature adopted a transport 
accidents scheme66 along with a revamped workers' compensa-
tion scheme.66 These reforms abolished common-law rights and 
remedies for injuries arising under the terms of the legislation. 67 
Quite remarkably, however, the Transport Accidents Compensa-
tion Act of 1987, entering into force on July 1, 1987, though· 
adopting the bulk of the New South Wales Law Reform Com-
mission recommendations, rejected its central plank: The statute 
retains fault as the determinant of entitlement to compensa-
tion.68 The retention of fault contrasts with the Workers' Com-
pensation reform, which now resembles the American model es-
tablishing an exclusive no-fault code. 
63. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM CoMM'N, supra note 60, at 9-10. Point 5 is also 
made by Blum & Kalven, Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto Compensation Legis-
lation, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 341, 379. 
64. See supra note 60. 
65. Transport Accidents Compensation Act 1987, No. 101 (N.S.W.). 
66. Workers Compensation Act 1987, No. 70 (N.S.W.). 
67. Transport Accidents Compensation Act § 40(1): 
No right to or claim for damages or compensation or any other benefit (pecu-
niary or non-pecuniary) shall lie, otherwise than as provided by this Act, against 
any person for or in respect of the death of or bodily injury to a person caused 
by or arising out of a transport accident occurring on or after 1 July 1987. 
Workers Compensation Act § 149(1): 
A worker is not entitled to recover damages, otherwise than under this 
Act-(a) from the worker's employer; (b) from any person who is vicariously 
liable for the acts or omissions of that employer; or (c) from any person for 
whose acts or omissions that employer is vicariously liable. 
68. Transport Accidents Compensation Act § 31(1): 
If an injured person is able to prove, in accordance with the civil law, that 
another person is (in the capacity of the owner or driver of a motor vehicle or 
other form of transportation or conveyance to which this Act applies) liable, in 
whole or in part, for the bodily injury suffered by the injured person, the injured 
person is entitled to benefits under this Act. 
For commentary, see Phegan, The Scheme in Context-TransCare to TransCover, in 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION SEMINAR: THE NEW TRANSPORT ACCIDENT COMPENSATION 
SCHEME (University of Sydney; June 20, 1987) [hereinafter CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCA-
TION SEMINAR]. 
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By jettisoning the no-fault concept but adhering to other rec-
ommendations, the New South Wales legislation, termed the 
"TransCover" Scheme, takes an entirely idiosyncratic course, 
destined to subvert its own goals. The scheme provides that, to 
make a good claim for compensation, an injured person must 
prove "in accordance with the civil law, that another person is 
. . . liable, in whole or in part, for the bodily injury suffered by 
the injured person. "69 This determination is not, in the first 
place, made by a court. Rather, the Government Insurance Of-
fice (GIO) performs this function, in addition to a panoply of 
other administrative and supervisory functions. 70 The GIO hears 
claims71 and then has the duty to "advise and assist persons in 
the preparation and making of claims for benefits."72 At the 
same time, the GIO must undertake the apparently conflicting 
task of investigating the claim, while ensuring that it is "not 
dealt with in an adversary manner."73 The GIO also looks to its 
fiscal responsibilities in matching income with outgo. 
Plainly, determining and supervising entitlements requires 
Solomonic wisdom. Indeed, one wonders how the GIO can deter-
mine fault, combined with the permissible defense of contribu-
tory negligence,74 without judicial antecedents. Uncertainty will 
abound, and an accompanying increase in the cost of claims dis-
position will result. Transaction costs, the vice visited upon the 
common law, will return to stalk the TransCover Scheme. 
The TransCover Scheme calculates compensation for wage 
loss on the basis of either total or partial disability. Subject to 
proof of fault, the Scheme entitles a totally disabled wage earner 
to benefits of eighty percent of earnings to a maximum of $500 
per week. A partially disabled earner, fit to do at least some 
work, is entitled to wage loss benefits calculated at eighty per-
cent of the difference between preaccident or postaccident earn-
69. Transport Accidents Compensation Act § 31(1). For the contrary recommenda-
tion of the Law Reform Commission recommending a no-fault scheme, see NEW SOUTH 
WALES LAW REFORM COMM'N, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION WORKING PAPER I: A TRANSPORT 
ACCIDENT SCHEME FOR NEW SOUTH WALES x.xxix (1983). 
70. Transport Accidents Compensation Act § 12. 
71. Section 155. 
72. Section 157. 
73. Section 158(1)(a)-(b). For criticism see Ferguson, The Presentation of 
Claims-The Role of the Legal Profession, in CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION SEMINAR, 
supra note 68. 
74. Section 37 permits reduction of compensation for loss of earning capacity or com-
pensation in respect of permanent impairment. 
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ings, subject to the same maximum of $500 per week.n The GIO 
redetermines the extent of disability from time to time. 76 
The Scheme requires all hospital, medical, and associated 
costs to be paid in full, once again subject to considerations of 
fault. 77 Impairment of a physical function may attract a lump 
sum payment,78 calculated on the degree of permanent impair-
ment. A one hundred percent impairment in a person twenty-
five years or less of age will yield a lump sum payment of 
$120,000. The legislature intended that these determinations be 
medically based upon material including the American Medical 
Association's "Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment. "79 
This aspect of the Scheme prompts criticism. The use of simi-
lar impairment tables in the United States workers' compensa-
tion scheme has led to a disproportionate amount of litigation 
and expense. 80 The presence of such noneconomic categories is 
questionable when viewing the scheme in insurance terms. The 
cost of replacing earnings to the level of the prescribed ceiling, 
together with medical expenses, including rehabilitation, will be 
great. It should not be forgotten that very significant govern-
mental subsidization of health care in Australia may hide the 
real cost of the compensation system. The New Zealand Scheme 
has managed to suppress rapid apparent increases in compensa-
tion and death benefits because, among other reasons, the gov-
ernment's health care system bears the medical costs. In fact, 
real hospital and medical costs almost doubled in the first eight 
75. Section 79. 
76. Section 82. 
77. Section 47. 
78. Section 103. 
79. Section 106. 
Id. 
(1) The regulations may make provision for or with respect to the basis on which 
the degree of a permanent impairment shall be assessed. 
(2) Regulations made for the purposes of subsection (1) may provide for the 
adoption, wholly or in part and with or without modification, of-
(a) the publication entitled "Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impair-
ment" published by the American Medical Association; 
(b) any adaptation of the publication referred to in paragraph (a) by any gov-
ernment department or instrumentality within Australia; 
(c) the publication entitled "Guide to the Assessment of Rates of Veterans' 
Pensions" prepared by the Commonwealth Repatriation Commission; or 
(d) any other standard or set of criteria for assessing the degree of a perma-
nent impairment published by any person other than the GIO. 
80. 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 57.14, 57.15 (1986). See gener-
ally M. BERKOWITZ & J. BURTON, PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS IN WORKERS' COMPEN-
SATION (1987). 
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years of the New Zealand Scheme's operation; lump sums for 
noneconomic loss trebled.81 
Adding on noneconomic recovery to compensation for eco-
nomic losses may therefore threaten financial viability. Only 
careful-and expensive-monitoring will avoid cost escalation. 
Significantly, insurance policies involving life, health, and fire 
insurance uniformly eschew coverage for noneconomic loss. A 
narrow exception is disability insurance; this exception is "nar-
row" because it makes available only relatively small liquidated 
amounts for loss of limbs and other bodily functions. One expla-
nation for such reluctance to reward noneconomic loss relates to 
the violation of the principle of indemnity on which insurance 
depends for its solvency and integrity. 82 That principle states 
that the value of insurance benefits should not exceed the loss to 
the insurance payee. Otherwise, the payee is encouraged to incur 
the loss. Because psychic loss is so subjective, any attempt to 
measure it-even by a so-called objective means based on degree 
of disability-can be manipulated by the insurance payee.83 In 
effect, non-liability insurers do not sell coverage for 
noneconomic loss because they fear its uncontrollable effects on 
claim frequency and accident claim costs. They probably rightly 
infer that, in a voluntary market, insurance buyers would not 
choose to pay the substantial extra premiums needed to cover 
the prospect of such noneconomic loss. 84 
Reasons beyond fiscal viability can be identified. Mandatory, 
even if small, amounts for noneconomic loss for serious injuries 
may be viewed as derisory. They may affront the polity even 
more than a candid refusal to pay such amounts at all. 86 The 
desire to provide noneconomic compensation is perhaps under-
81. Woodfield, Insurance, Incentives and the Privatization of Social Welfare, 3 
C.I.S. PoL'Y REP. 11 (1987) (the officially estimated cost of private medical treatment in 
1986 of $24.5 million was overly sanguine; $98 million was in fact expended); see 
Crumpton, An Evaluation of the New Zealand and Victorian Schemes (Aug. 1983) (un-
published seminar given at the University of New South Wales). 
82. O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering 
in Return for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 344-48; 
see also S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AccmENT LAW 229-31 (1987). Shavell notes 
that "insurance coverage is intended mainly to remedy pecuniary needs created by 
losses, not to compensate for disability due to losses." Id. at 231. 
83. O'Connell, supra note 82, at 343-44. 
84. See, e.g., K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY AND PUBLIC 
Poucy 14-18 (1986) (discussing general aspects of risk allocation and demand for insur-
ance coverage). 
85. O'Connell & Partlett, Accident Compensation Working Papers: A Transport Ac-
cident Scheme for New South Wales, in PERSONAL COMPENSATION FOR INJURY, supra 
note 29, at 8. 
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standable because the scheme is promoted as an equitable re-
placement of present common-law damages. But its inclusion, in 
our view, creates a considerable risk to the long-term financial 
viability of the scheme. 
The TransCover Scheme includes detailed provisions for 
nonearners,86 for the young,87 and for the dependents of persons 
killed as a result of transport accidents.88 A medical review panel 
hears appeals. 89 Matters not relating to medical assessment are 
appealed to the New South Wales District Court. 00 
The basic reason for the adoption of this scheme was to con-
tain increasing cost that had begun to induce marked increases 
in compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance premium rates. 
This scheme purported to control costs. 91 Herein lies the reason 
for the retention of fault. 92 Fault provides a sieve for claims, ef-
fectively reducing the numbers of successful claims, in turn re-
ducing the apparent cost of the scheme. The cost is "apparent," 
because it seems that the administration costs must rival, and 
probably initially surpass, those of the common law. Fault has 
survived along with the defense of contributory negligence. In 
addition, total exclusion from benefits awaits those who fail to 
report accidents or who have incurred the injury in the commis-
sion of a crime.93 Partial exclusion may follow from, among other 
things, conviction for a number of offenses under the Motor 
Traffic Act 1909, for drunken driving, and for failure to wear a 
seat belt. 94 
In a similar way, the TransCover Scheme exacerbates litiga-
tion costs where substantive rights depend upon definitions of 
compensable events. Recall the considerable difficulties in defin-
ing the meaning of "the course of employment" in the workers' 
compensation field. 05 The task of defining "death of or bodily 
injury to a person caused by or arising out of a transport acci-
dent"96 will not be as difficult as determining fault. However, the 
scheme is partial and does not cover all injury and illness. Incen-
86. Transport Accidents Compensation Act §§ 51, 68-78. 
87. Section 84. 
88. Sections 123-143. 
89. Sections 180, 184. 
90. Sections 184, 186. 
91. N.S.W. Gov'T INFORMATION SERV., TRANSCOVER: THE NSW TRANSPORT ACCIDENT 
COMPENSATION SCHEME 3 (1987). 
92. Section 31; see Phegan, supra note 68, at 5. 
93. Sections 34-35. 
94. Section 38. 
95. lA A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 20-29 (1985). 
96. Section 40. 
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tives to litigate will arise to classify the injury circumstances ei-
ther as governed by the common law or the statutory regime. 97 
As witnessed in the American law, the choice will depend on 
how the litigant is advantaged.98 
This overview touches the surface of schemes that bristle with 
definitional issues calling for legal battle. It is something of a 
chimera in our complex rights-accented society to imagine that 
the institution of the courts can be completely bypassed, espe-
cially if fault remains the talisman. If anything, we may more 
realistically expect voluntary arrangements to be more success-
ful than those bureaucratically imposed.99 
2. Victoria and South Australia proposals- In contrast to 
the New South Wales approach, Victoria and South Australia 
attacked tort reform in reverse order: industrial accident reform 
legislation predated motor traffic accident reform legislation. 
Both states were motivated by the burdensome cost of insurance 
premiums to cover an employer's potential liability.100 In Aus-
tralia, in contrast to the United States, the no-fault workers' 
compensation schemes did not provide exclusive rights; injured 
workers could still have recourse to an action at common law 
against an employer. Such a cumbersome workers' compensation 
system provoked cries for relief from industry. With heavily la-
bor-intensive industry under severe cost pressures in the 1980's, 
these cries echoed down the political corridors. Faltering indus-
try and increasing unemployment rates had immediate political 
consequences. The legal academic community, seeing an oppor-
tunity to rekindle the reform process that had been stalled for so 
long, provided an important pro-reform ally. 101 As a result, both 
Victoria and South Australia moved to trim the cost in schemes 
97. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 303 
(1965); 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 65.00-67.29 (1987); Havighurst, 
"Medical Adversity Insurance"-Has Its Time Come?, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1233, 1241-43; 
O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability, supra note 4, at 501-23 (1976); 
Schnidman & Salzler, The Legal Malpractice Dilemma: Will New Standards of Care 
Place Professional Liability Insurance Beyond the Reach of the Specialist?, 45 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 541, 555 (1976). 
98. For example, the courts have bowed to arguments to limit the reach of no-fault 
legislation so as not to cover intentionally tortious acts. Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio 
St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984); Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacrom Chems., 69 Ohio 
St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982). But cf. Streeter v. Sullivan, 
509 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1987); Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 
1986); Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Prods., Inc., 498 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1986). 
99. O'Connell & Joost, supra note 24; see also supra note 49. 
100. OFFICE OF THE PREMIER, WORKCARE: EXPLANATORY NOTES ON VICTORIA'S NEW 
APPROACH TO ACCIDENT PREVENTION, REHABILITATION, AND COMPENSATION 3 (1985); SOUTH 
AUSTRALIAN PROPOSALS FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION REFORM (1985). 
101. See Fleming, Is There a Future for Tort?, 58 AusTL. L.J. 131 (1984). 
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made appropriately palatable for labor union acceptance-a vi-
tal strategy because unions cherished the availability of com-
mon-law relief. This bias on the part of labor unions has impli-
cations for tort reform in the United States. 
Both Victoria in 1985102 and South Australia in 1986103 en-
acted legislation that provides more generous no-fault workplace 
benefits than previously applicable, but at the same time, se-
verely curtails resort to the common law. The legislation in Vic-
toria limits an injured worker's tort claim to nonpecuniary dam-
ages, except for wrongful death and accidents occurring during 
employment involving travel.10• The South Australian legislation 
similarly restricts an injured worker's tort claim to nonpecuniary 
damages. These damages, if awarded, must not exceed 1.4 
times1011 the amount payable under the no-fault provision for 
compensation of noneconomic loss.106 This no-fault, 
noneconomic amount is calculated according to a schedule that 
sets forth a percentage disability taken from a table of maiming 
injuries. The maximum recovery allowed under the no-fault 
scheme for a disability occurring in 1986 was $60,000. Hence, the 
maximum obtainable at common law for such disabilities in 1986 
was $84,000. For example, total and incurable paralysis lists at 
one hundred percent. Wrongful death is especially treated where 
the employee was, or ought to have been, covered by third-party 
motor vehicle insurance, and a common-law action without re-
striction may be brought. 107 
The scheme compensates the partially or totally incapacitated 
South Australian worker on the basis of weekly payments for 
loss of income in the following way: First, if the worker is inca-
pacitated for less than one year, the entitlement will equal the 
worker's notional weekly earnings if totally incapacitated. "No-
tional weekly earnings" are the worker's average weekly earnings 
as adjusted by inflation or pay increases.108 If partially incapaci-
tated, the worker's entitlement equals the difference between 
the worker's notional weekly earnings and the weekly earnings 
that the worker earns or could earn in suitable substitute em-
ployment.109 Second, if the period of incapacity exceeds one 
102. Accident Compensation Act, 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, as amended by the Accident 
Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1986 Viet. Acts 48. 
103. Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act, 1986 S. Aust!. Acts 124. 
104. Accident Compensation Act, 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, § 135(1). 
105. 1986 S. Aust!. Acts 124, § 54. 
106. Section 43. 
107. Section 54(2). 
108. Section 3. 
109. Section 35(1)(a). 
SPRING 1988) Comparative Tort Reform 469 
year, the worker is entitled to payments of up to eighty percent 
of the worker's notional weekly earnings. If partially incapaci-
tated, the worker's entitlement equals eighty percent of the dif-
ference between the worker's notional weekly earnings and the 
weekly earnings that the worker earns or could earn in suitable 
employment that the worker has a reasonable prospect of 
obtaining. 
The Victorian legislation entitles, but also limits, a totally in-
capacitated worker to eighty percent of "pre-injury average 
weekly earnings" or $400, whichever is less. 110 The statute 
prescribes a minimum payment to protect low income earners. A 
partially incapacitated worker is entitled to compensation so 
long as an actual or deemed drop in income exists. m In this 
case, the worker is entitled to eighty-five percent of the differ-
ence between the current weekly earnings and the worker's "pre-
injury average weekly earnings" or $400, whichever is less. This, 
in effect, places a ceiling upon the recovery that an injured 
worker may make. 
Provisions under both states' legislation exist for administra-
tive review of payments. South Australia's full income replace-
ment for the first twelve months deserves brief comment. This 
provision is imprudent because it entrenches an incentive to 
claim for minor injuries. If anything, the bias should be reversed 
-the catastrophically injured should be favored. Political com-
promise explains this revision. The unions had negotiated bene-
fits with employers under industrial awards that would establish 
in the Australian industrial system a catalog of employment 
terms and conditions enforceable through a system of industrial 
courts. In other words, deference to the political potency of 
union interests explains this provision. It is part of the sugar-
coating that, in our view, will ultimately have detrimental conse-
quences for the health of the scheme. 
In both Victoria and South Australia, prior to this new legisla-
tion, an employer's private insurance policies covered workers' 
compensation liability. Both states have placed a portion of the 
blame for the cost of the old system on the private insurers. Ac-
cordingly, the new legislation eschews the use of private insur-
ers. Instead, an employer in the ordinary case must pay a levy to 
a governmental body established pursuant to the legislation. 
110. 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, § 93(4). 
111. Section 93(1). 
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Employers pay this levy according to a percentage of the ag-
gregate remuneration paid to workers.112 To some extent, the 
legislation recognizes the need to create incentives for safety by 
penalizing "dangerous industries"113 and rewarding safe eIIlploy-
ers. m The legislation in Victoria does not allow an increase in 
the rate levels before September 1990. m This aspect causes dis-
quiet, because it signals that rate-setting may become a political 
pawn instead of a reflection of the riskiness of particular catego-
ries of industry. If so, rate-setting would undermine the provi-
sions for safety promotion.116 The shorter political horizon would 
substitute for the longer market-oriented actuarial risk.117 
The legislation in Victoria and South Australia predictably at-
tempts to minimize the participation of the courts. Designated 
government officials make determinations of eligibility subject to 
internal appeal.118 Both acts, however, preserve avenues of ap-
peal, limited to questions of law, to their respective supreme 
courts.119 
In the motor vehicle accident area, Victoria has recently intro-
duced a no-fault scheme. This scheme replaces and repeals an 
earlier no-fault scheme that provided limited add-on no-fault 
benefits.120 The Transport Accident Act of 1986 became effective 
January 1, 1987.121 If a transportation accident subsequent to 
that date causes personal injury, the victim may bring an action 
at common law only where the injury is defined as "serious."122 
The Act provides that the no-fault benefits for total loss of 
earnings are either eighty percent of the preaccident weekly 
earnings or calculated on a scale of payments determined by 
numbers of dependents, whichever is greater.123 In any event, a 
112. 1986 S. Aust!. Acts 124, § 66; 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, § 187. 
113. 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, § 188(1); 1986 S. Aust!. Acts 124, § 16(9). 
114. 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, § 189(6); 1986 S. Austl. Acts 124, § 67. 
115. 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, § 187(5). 
116. See, e.g., 1986 S. Aust!. Acts 124, § 29. 
117. Public choice theory properly alerts us to possible shortcomings of discretionary 
bureaucratic decision making. See, e.g., G. BRENNAN & J. BucHANAN, THE REASON OF 
RULES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (1985); see also S. BREYER, REGULATION AND 
ITS REFORM (1982) (discussing problems of regulation and proposed solutions); Peltzman, 
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976) (discussing 
the influence of special interest groups). 
118. See, e.g., Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act, 1986 S. Aust!. Acts 
124, Part VI (Reviews and Appeals). 
119. Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act, 1986 S. Aust!. Acts 124, § 69; 
Accident Compensation Act, 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, § 68. 
120. Motor Accidents Act, 1973 Viet. Acts 8429. 
121. Transport Accident Act, 1986 Viet. Acts 111. 
122. Section 93. 
123. Sections 44(1) & (2). 
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weekly payment must not exceed either $430 or one hundred 
percent of preaccident earnings. If partial loss of earnings has 
occurred, the benefit is eighty-five percent of the difference be-
tween the current weekly earnings and preaccident weekly earn-
ings or determined according to a scale by numbers of depen-
dents.12• If a person has suffered a total loss of earnings, the 
same upper limit applies-$43O or one hundred percent of lost 
earnings. In addition, an injured person who suffers a degree of 
impairment of more than ten percent may claim an "impairment 
benefit" according to a formula turning upon the degree of im-
pairment, with one hundred percent impairment leading to a 
stipulated payment of $40,580. m The injured person may re-
ceive this benefit by way either of a lump sum or periodic pay-
ment. Detailed and specific provisions cover minors, nonearners, 
dependent spouses, surviving children, and others. All monetary 
amounts are indexed to inflation based on projected increases in 
average weekly earnings.126 The Act also covers the cost of medi-
cal services. 127 
Under the Victorian Transport Accident Act, only those suf-
fering "serious injury" have recourse to the common law. Serious 
injury is defined as an injury indicating a degree of impairment 
of thirty percent or more, including wrongful death. 128 If an ac-
tion is brought, the Act limits potential damages. Damages for 
pecuniary losses and pain and suffering cannot be awarded if the 
total assessed for both is less then $20,000.129 The Act prohibits 
recovery of pain and suffering damages exceeding $200,000130 
and pecuniary damages in excess of $450,000.131 It caps total 
damages in wrongful death actions at $500,000.132 
The Act allows for appeals from administrative determina-
tions made pursuant to the Act. 133 This scheme, unlike that es-
tablished under the earlier Accident Compensation Act, central-
izes the collection of levies and the payment of compensation in 
a governmental body, dubbed the Transport Accident Commis-
124. Sections 45(1) & (2). 
125. Section 47. 
126. Section 61. 
127. Section 60. 
128. Section 93(3). 
129. Sections 93(7)(a)(i) & (b)(i). 
130. Section 93(7)(b)(ii). 
131. Id. 
132. Section 93(9). 
133. Sections 77-83. 
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sion.134 The Commission also has safety and rehabilitation 
functions. 
The South Australian legislation, on the other hand, drasti-
cally reduces recovery of damages for motor accidents, without 
providing attendant no-fault benefits. No damages may be 
awarded for noneconomic loss unless the injury significantly im-
paired the person's ability to lead a normal life for a period of at 
least seven days or resulted in medical expenses of at least 
$1,000. 1311 This approach, as applied in 1987, awards 
noneconomic losses on the statutory formula that produces a 
maximum of $60,000. The legislation prohibits damages for 
mental or nervous shock, except where the plaintiff was actually 
present at the accident or was a parent, spouse, or child of the 
victim.136 
C. Some Lessons 
The Australian reforms, like the present American ad hoc re-
form phenomenon, respond in a shallow way to apparent acci-
dent cost increases. They demonstrate little real concern for 
those most disadvantaged by accidents-the catastrophically in-
jured. Most obvious are a group of reforms designed to directly 
lower damage awards to successful plaintiffs. Two High Court of 
Australia decisions fueled damage awards, resulting in increased 
third-party premium rates for automobile and workers' compen-
sation.137 In these cases, the High Court exhibited a genuine 
concern that damages should be tailored with the goals of tort 
law in mind. But the political pressure of a large class of pre-
mium payors ignored such arguments.138 
State legislatures reflected more deeply when considering the 
schemes discussed above. Nonetheless, political expediency 
ruled the day. The shortcomings of the schemes were not thor-
oughly considered. For example, the schemes adopt a system of 
134. See § 12 for a complete list of functions. 
135. Wrongs Act Amendment, 1986 S. Austl. Acts 126, § 35. This $1,000 amount 
could change. 
136. Cf. Jaensch v. Coffey, 155 C.L.R. 549 (Austl. 1984) (extending liability for ner-
vous shock). 
137. Tordorovic v. Waller, 150 C.L.R. 402 (Austl. 1981) (setting the applicable dis-
count rate for calculation of loss of future earning capacity and health care costs); Grif-
fiths v. Kerkemeyer, 139 C.L.R. 161 (Austl. 1977) (allowing damages for voluntary nurs-
ing services). 
138. Schwartz, The Advantages of Tort, in PERSONAL COMPENSATION FOR INJURY, 
supra note 29, at 70. 
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periodic payments under which accident victims arguably be-
come mendicants of the state. They lose independence and, with 
it, a vital incentive to rehabilitation. The low ceilings provided 
in the Australian reforms also trench upon the middle class vic-
tim who may witness a severe reduction in his circumstances. 
Although purchasing insurance may ameliorate this problem, it 
seems ironic that a state compensation scheme enacted with the 
aim of equitable and adequate compensation for accident vic-
tims should stimulate a significant private insurance market. To 
be sure, victims of catastrophic injury will have coverage for 
long-term medical needs. But if, as is likely, medical costs in-
crease exponentially, then the quality of health care will also 
suffer unless national health care funding is radically increased. 
In this way, the Australian reforms do not meet the often re-
peated criticism that the common-law system favors the mildly 
over the catastrophically injured.139 Instead, the Australian re-
forms compound the sin. 
Ideally, a rational inquiry should open the way for considera-
tion of all vying interests, and the weight of good sense and logic 
should lead to beneficial reform. The Australian experience gives 
pause to those who argue for such an ideal. The report of the 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission on a Transport Ac-
cident Scheme for New South Wales provides a case study. The 
partial adoption of the report's recommendation of a compre-
hensive no-fault scheme for auto accidents undermined the very 
goals of the recommendations. That this befalls reform in 
Benthamite Australia indicates that it would occur to a much 
greater degree in the United States. 
A lesson to be extracted from the Australian experience is that 
optimal reform must account for all contending interests. Suc-
cessful reform may be more realistically achieved if a structure 
of rules can be fabricated whereby parties may have more free-
dom to choose desirable compensation agreements. This ap-
proach not only makes reform achievable, but also makes the 
reform, once adopted, ·more likely to be acceptable to the com-
munity. Keep in mind that if no-fault insurance could be struc-
tured to compete side-by-side with tort liability insurance, the 
state agency would be compelled to administer efficiently and 
keep up-to-date, adequate benefits.140 In a changing society, we 
should beware of legislative reforms that unduly restrict choice 
139. See J. FLEMING, supra note 12, at 377; see also P. CANE, supra note 56, at 291-
312. 
140. See supra note 24. 
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and change. Of all possible choices, an elective no-fault scheme 
is more likely, over time, to conform to Professor Keeton's 
desiderata. 141 
Mindful of our predictions that the Australian legislation pos-
sesses flaws, we now set forth an alternative. We are encouraged 
that the New South Wales legislation provides for a Review 
Committee, signaling that the book of reform is not closed. 142 
III. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
An examination of the Australian reform experience may play 
a valuable role in the formulation of any proposal for reform. 
The controversy between the merits of no-fault versus fault-
based compensation schemes raises the possibility of allowing 
both types of compensation to compete side-by-side with one 
another under elective programs. 
A. An Elective No-Fault Scheme 
This Part sets forth contractual and legislative schemes that 
may avoid many of the pitfalls of comprehensive state-directed 
schemes and of ad hoc short-sighted reform measures. These 
schemes of reform would fit both within the United States and 
Australia. Indeed, in Australia we speculate that the flaws of the 
Victorian, South Australian, and New South Wales legislation 
may force some reformulation along the lines suggested. In the 
United States, we hope that more mature consideration of tort 
reform measures may encourage adoption of the type of mea-
sures outlined. Because the no-fault alternative has already been 
aired before American legal audiences, 143 this Part concentrates 
on how the reform would operate in Australia. Nevertheless, our 
discussion is material for American reformers. Its "outside" re-
view and summarization should be instructive in showing how 
an elective no-fault system may function. 
The proposed elective no-fault reform would allow govern-
ments to initiate no-fault changes interstitially and selec-
tively-even electively. The fact that state-owned insurance 
141. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
142. Transport Accidents Compensation Act 1987, No. 101 (N.S.W.), §§ 204-205. A 
similar review is contemplated under the Workers Compensation Act 1987, No. 70, § 8 
(N.S.W.). 
143. See supra note 4. 
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companies, as authorized insurers, write almost all third-party 
personal injury motor vehicle liability insurance in Australia 
greatly facilitates an elective form of no-fault insurance at least 
for motor accidents. For example, even without enabling legisla-
tion, the Government Insurance Office of New South Wales 
(GIO) could offer its insured drivers a no-fault motor vehicle 
policy calling for no-fault benefits of the type recommended by 
the Law Reform Commission. The GIO could pay benefits for 
personal injury to insured persons and their relatives residing in 
the same household. In return, the insured persons and all their 
dependent no-fault beneficiaries would, at the time of purchas-
ing the policy, waive any rights to sue any GIG-insured motor 
vehicle driver in tort for personal injury.144 
B. A Contractual Elective No-Fault Scheme 
Because the GIO of New South Wales obtains the benefit of 
avoiding payment of tort damages to the no-fault insured drivers 
and their relatives under a contract waiving potential tort 
claims, these savings could fund the payment of no-fault bene-
fits to no-fault insured persons. The United States' no-fault ex-
perience demonstrates that payment of no-fault benefits is, in 
gross, much less costly to an insurer than payment of tort dam-
ages. Thus, no-fault benefits should cost no more-and probably 
substantially less-than tort liability insurance. At whatever 
comparative cost, an insured person would have the option of 
deciding which form of insurance better suits her needs: no-fault 
or fault-based. 
A proposal for elective no-fault may come in various forms. 
For example, it could expand the spectrum of insurance offer-
ings. The insurer could offer: (1) a no-fault package that adds on 
no-fault benefits, with no restraint on suing in tort apart from 
·deducting benefits already paid under no-fault; (2) a no-fault 
package with benefits comparable to those under the New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission's Report, with a concomitant 
contractual waiver of tort rights; or (3) regular tort liability 
coverage. 
144. For a discussion of this proposal, including the issue of how minors could be 
bound to the no-fault choice, see O'Connell, Transferring Injured Victims' Tort Rights 
to No-Fault Insurers: New "Sole Remedy" Approaches to Cure Liability Insurance Ills, 
1977 U. ILL. L.F. 749, 790 n.136. For another elective no-fault auto insurance proposal, 
utilizing uninsured motorists coverage, see O'Connell & Joost, supra note 24. 
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In the usual motor vehicle accident, passengers and driver 
proceed against another insured driver. Rarer cases include ac-
tions against parties other than drivers of vehicles. Manufactur-
ers of cars and component parts form a category of possible 
third-party defendants. Under the elective no-fault scheme, a 
common-law action would lie against these other categories. 
Preaccident waivers of tort rights against motorists may en-
courage a search for other third-party defendants. 
We consider encouraging actions against these defendants de-
sirable. Because of greater difficulties in bringing actions against, 
for example, manufacturers and road designers, these defend-
ants probably are comparatively unrepresented in today's litiga-
tion. Targeting them more frequently as defendants in common-
law actions may well cause them to invest more heavily in 
safety. These defendants are arguably in a better position than 
motorists to take the most meaningful safety precautions. 14~ Our 
scheme has the benefit, not shared by the New South Wales re-
form, of heightened emphasis on the common law in an area 
where it is more likely to fulfill its role of encouraging safety. 
A more complex scheme could apply to any insurer, not just 
one with a governmental monopoly on automobile coverage, and 
could apply to liability for any kind of accident, not just those 
involving automobiles. Under this scheme, an insurer could sell 
first-party, no-fault coverage for wage and health benefits, while 
providing that once the no-fault payment is made, the no-fault 
insurer succeeds to the rights of the no-fault beneficiary against 
any tortfeasor, including rights to pain and suffering.146 Unlike 
the simple contractual arrangements above, this version of the 
scheme is complicated by recondite law relating to assignment of 
bare rights of action.147 "[E]quity did not allow the assignment 
of a bare right of action, whether legal or equitable . . . on the 
ground that it savoured of or · was likely to lead to 
maintenance. "148 
Courts, however, will enforce such an assignment if the con-. 
tract of insurance constitutes "a genuine commercial interest"149 
in a chose in action that arises independently of the arrange-
145. O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 299, 331-70 (1963). 
146. O'Connell & Brown, A Canadian Proposal for No-Fault Benefits Financed by 
Assignments of Tort Rights, 33 U. TORONTO L.J. 434, 437-39 (1983). 
147. Id. at 441-50. 
148. Glegg v. Bromley, (1912] 3 K.B. 474, 490 (Parker, J.); see also Trendtex Trading 
Corp. v. Credit Suisse, 1982 A.C. 679. 
149. Trendtex Trading Corp, 1982 A.C. at 703; see also Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of 
Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). 
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ment to maintain the action. 1110 The chose in action-the right of 
action-under our scheme is the quid pro quo for the granting of 
no-fault compensation rights. It arises independently of any ar-
rangement to maintain the action and hence is enforceable. 
Arguably, under a scheme involving assignment of a cause of 
action, many insureds could not make a truly informed choice, 
at the time of purchasing insurance, between fault and no-fault 
insurance, given the complexity of tort law and insurance. The 
potential for confusion of insureds may even cause a court to 
render such a no-fault choice not binding on an injury victim 
who turns out to have a clear case under tort liability. 1111 
Australian courts would subject such agreements to close scru-
tiny. Moreover, they could employ the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility as a basis for setting aside contracts. 1112 A court may set 
aside a contract at the behest of an underprivileged or mis-
informed promisor. Factors that may persuade a court to set 
aside the contract include a plaintiff's lack of information, a 
plaintiff's reliance on a misapprehension brought to the notice of 
the defendant, and a plaintiff's inexperience with matters· and 
language of a commercial nature. 
The Canadian case of Pridmore v. Calvert1113 is directly rele-
vant to a waiver of rights in the insurance context. In this case, 
the plaintiff executed a release of liability in favor of the defend-
ant insurance company soon after an accident. The court set 
aside the release on the basis of the doctrine of inequality of 
bargaining power.1114 The court emphasized the unequal informa-
tion possessed by the parties, especially at a time soon after the 
accident before the plaintiff could acquire independent legal ad-
vice. 11111 Another case viewing the relationships between insurer 
150. R. MEAGHER, W. GUMMOW & J. LEHANE, EQUITY: DOCTRINE AND REMEDIES 694 (2d 
ed. 1984). 
151. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compen-
sation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775, 789-97 (1982); O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability by 
Contract-With or Without an Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 59, 67-72. 
152. For Australian doctrine, see Commercial Bank of Aust!. v. Amadio, 57 A.L.R. 
358 (Aust!. 1983). For American doctrine, now of some maturity, see Phillips Home Fur-
nishings v. Continental Bank, 231 Pa. Super. 174, 180-82, 331 A.2d 840, 843-44 (1974), 
order rev'd, 467 Pa. 43, 354 A.2d 542 (1976); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionabil-
ity, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bar-
gaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L.J. 
359 (1976). 
153. 54 D.L.R.3d 133 (1975). 
154. Id. at 144; cf. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). 
155. Pridmore, 54 D.L.R.3d at 141-44. 
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and insured also emphasized the crucial element of independent 
advice. m Australian courts would consider such cases under the 
unconscionability doctrine or alternatively, if a relationship were 
established and continued, under undue influence. In any event, 
independent advice under Australian as well as Canadian law 
destroys the basic ingredients of unconscionability and dispels a 
presumption of undue influence. 1117 
The elective, no-fault scheme of reform, therefore, may well 
require the opportunity of independent legal advice. But to pro-
vide it to each insurance buyer at the time she buys insurance 
would be cumbersome and expensive. In addition, the uncertain-
ties in judicial attitude may dissuade an insurer from this inno-
vative path.158 
Two strategies may circumvent these possible stumbling 
blocks. First, given the political will, legislation could authorize 
insureds to enter into elective no-fault arrangements of the type 
suggested. The legislation could definitively establish guidelines 
for the fairness of the election, for example, stipulating the ex-
tent and nature of information to convey to the insured. The 
legislation could describe the class of persons covered in an in-
surance policy. It could also provide that the election of a policy 
binds those persons and, at the same time, allows them to en-
force the no-fault contract against the insurer. The disadvantage 
of this strategy lies in the usually cumbersome and, as we have 
seen, unpredictable nature of having legislation enacted. 159 Fur-
thermore, such legislation will naturally be viewed as controver-
sial because it may appear, by undermining traditional common-
law rights, to favor strong insurance companies over weak indi-
vidual claimants. 
Another method, fully consistent with freedom of choice, to 
surmount these difficulties could allow the insurer to bind itself 
by a preaccident guarantee to tender such no-fault benefits, but 
bestow upon the accident victim a postaccident choice to reject 
156. Wawanesa Mutual Ins. Co. v. Buchanan, 74 D.L.R.3d 330 (1976). 
157. See Commercial Bank of Austl. v. Amadio, 57 A.L.R. 358, 366 (Austl. 1983); 
Lloyds Bank v. Bundy, [1975) 1 Q.B. 326, 336-39; National Westminster Bank v. Mor-
gan, [1983) 3 All E.R. 85, 91. 
158. O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury 
Claims by Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 589, 627-628 (1982); see Veitch, Cosmetic Reform: Periodic Payments and Struc-
tured Settlements, 7 U. TASMANIA L. REV. 136, 138-42 (1982); cf. Shearson/American Ex-
press v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2337-38 (1987) (upholding the enforceability of an 
arbitration clause in a broker/client contract). 
159. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. 
SPRING 1988] Comparative Tort Reform 479 
such benefits and sue in tort. 160 Such a scheme would probably 
withstand any judicial scrutiny, because no one loses any com-
mon-law rights unless, after the accident, a victim with advice as 
to the available rights under tort and no-fault schemes surren-
ders a fault-based claim in return for no-fault benefits. Conse-
quently, the accident victim could not argue unconscionability of 
the contract or unlawful assignment of the cause of action. 
This exception, however, raises the possibility of adverse se-
lection against the insurer. If a victim could choose after an acci-
dent whether to press a fault-based or a no-fault claim, those 
with valid fault-based claims would more likely press them, and 
those without fault-based claims would collect no-fault benefits. 
As a result, an insurer would not have the benefit of a surrender 
of fault-based claims to provide income to pay no-fault benefits. 
For this reason, reform along these lines should reserve the obli-
gation to tender no-fault benefits for very serious cases-for ex-
ample, those with losses of, say, $25,000 or over. Given the 
marked preference of most seriously injured victims for cer-
tainty of benefits as opposed to the risks of a tort suit, most of 
them-even those with a good chance of tort recovery-would 
likely prefer immediate, certain no-fault benefits to an uncer-
tain, dilatory tort recovery. For those with serious injuries, the 
gamble and delay of proving liability and of having damages re-
duced by contributory negligence militates in favor of a no-fault 
choice. Moreover, those afflicted with serious injuries will recog-
nize that once liability is proved and damages have been 
awarded, the possibility of unforeseeable changes in their lives 
renders those damages of dubious value when compared with a 
flexible periodic payment system tailored to changing needs. 161 
A scheme allowing the accident victim a postaccident choice 
between fault and no-fault claims will be more expensive than 
one providing such a victim with only a preaccident choice. A 
preaccident choice allows even victims with small claims who are 
generously compensated under the pain and suffering compo-
nent to have their tort claims foreclosed, thus releasing more 
funds to pay no-fault claims. A postaccident choice, on the other 
hand, gives those with relatively small claims much less incen-
tive to surrender their tort claims. The rational small claimant, 
given the chances of a very generous settlement of his claims, 
will engage in the forensic lottery of the tort claim. Allowing this 
160. See generally O'Connell, A Neo No-Fault Contract in Lieu of Torts: Preac-
cident Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898 (1985). 
161. J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, supra note 16, at 126. 
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postaccident choice, then, will result in fewer savings from elimi-
nation of a multitude of smaller claims with their comparatively 
large pain and suffering component. 
This elective, no-fault scheme is not novel. The 1978 Report 
of the Board of Inquiry into Motor Vehicle Accident Compen-
sation in Victoria urged a variant of the victims' postaccident 
election. The Report recommended such an elective device as a 
means of compensating for wage loss beyond the two-year wage 
loss limit under the former Victoria Motor Vehicle Act.162 In-
deed, Mr. Hanlon, Q.C., counsel in the Victorian inquiry, reiter-
ated such a variant in 1983: 
[A]t the end of the period of 104 weeks (or two years) of 
payments a person desirous of and eligible for continua-
tion of payments should appear before the Motor Acci-
dent Appeal Tribunal and seek an extension of their [sic] 
no-fault entitlement. This application, if granted, would 
involve the destruction of whatever common law right ex-
isted to compensation arising out of the incident which 
caused the disability and the person would have to sig-
nify to the Motor Accident Appeal Tribunal at the time 
of making the selection that was understood and ac-
cepted. On the other hand, the issue of proceedings at 
common law for damages would by itself destroy all 
rights to Motor Accident Board payments in excess of 
the existing [no-fault] limit. 
This would lead to a situation in which the award of an 
unlimited no-fault payment is a replacement of common 
law damages . . . . If it meant eventual disuse of the 
common law system then that would be at the wish of 
the citizens, expressed by the use to which they put the 
system, and far more acceptable than the outright de-
struction of it, in the hope that what one was doing was 
better than what one was destroying. It offers also the 
capacity to deal with the problems thrown up by the 
movements towards change as they arose and in a practi-
cal fashion rather than . . . creating the possibility that 
one set of problems is eradicated and replaced by another 
set equally intractable [ under a new scheme replacing 
traditional tort law]. This, in my view, would be a far 
better way to proceed into the future since it offers the 
162. BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION IN VICTORIA, 
REPORT 1111 9.61-.63 (1978). 
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advantage of allowing us to make decisions about per-
sons' rights based on our observations of what they, 
themselves, value more highly. It does not rely upon the 
judgment, however brilliantly informed, of an academic 
lawyer or even a politician of the best interests of their 
fellow citizens.163 
481 
Also illustrating the acceptability of this idea, workers' com-
pensation legislation in the state of Victoria included, in a differ-
ent form, an election requirement of this kind up to 1953.164 
Subsequently, legislation gave claimants a right to proceed both 
at common law and under the Act.1611 A number of High Court 
decisions describe the problems experienced by the workers' 
compensation system, especially up to 1938.166 The Act was 
amended in 1938 to provide for an express election by the claim-
ant. Considering the great concern in Australia relating to the 
rising cost of compensation for industrial accidents, 167 it is a pro-
pitious time to consider strategies that will lessen the burdens 
on employers but remain fair to injured employees. The reason 
stated at the time of the 1953 reform, that election imposed a 
hardship on a worker, would carry less weight today when the 
high costs of the 1953 reform are realized. 
Even without legislative intervention, the following strategy 
seems feasible. An employer could contractually guarantee a 
worker disabled for more than six months the option of trading 
his common-law right for a substantial augmentation (say up to 
seventy-tive percent of his actual wage loss) of the relatively low 
workers' compensation wage loss payment occurring after the 
six-month disability period has elapsed. Once again, the fact 
that severely injured workers are risk-averse would induce 
many-even with arguably valid, but disputable, tort claims-to 
opt for the certainty of lesser no-fault payment over the uncer-
tainty of larger tort payment. This strategy avoids the problem 
of adverse selection. Such devices may readily extend beyond 
163. Hanlon, Victorian Motor Accident Board and Common Law Rights, in CONFER-
ENCE PAPERS: THE COMPENSATION OF MOTOR ACCIDENT VICTIMS IN VICTORIA-A MODEL 
FOR AUSTRALIA? 45-49 (Law Institute of Victoria 1983). 
164. See Workers' Compensation Act 1928 § 12, V V1CT. STAT. 1410-11 (1929). 
165. See Workers' Compensation Act 1958 § 63, VIII VICT. STAT. 1083 (1958). 
166. See, e.g., O'Connor v. S.P. Bray Ltd., 56 C.L.R. 464 (Aust!. 1937). 
167. Numerous reports have reached this conclusion. See COMM. OF ENQUIRY INTO THE 
VICTORIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM, REPORT (1984) (the Cooney Report); JOINT 
COMM. OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY-WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
TASMANIA, Report (1977); JUDICIAL ENQUIRY INTO THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT OF 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA, REPORT (1979); SOUTH AUSTRALIAN PROPOSALS FOR WORKERS' COM-
PENSATION REFORM (1985). 
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the liability of employers and drivers. Reform under workers' 
compensation may prompt other classes of persons having a pat-
tern of exposure to liability to seek insurance coverage that 
would afford no-fault benefits to those making these types of 
claims. These classes may include occupiers of premises, health 
care providers, and manufacturers. 
The area of school and athletic injuries, exciting some atten-
tion in Australia and the United States in recent years,168 pro-
vides another example of innovative coverages bypassing tort li-
ability.169 The rugby scrum, like the American football line, is a 
classic injury-producing machine. The senior author has drafted 
an insurance contract based on a preaccident commitment to 
make a postaccident tender of net economic loss within ninety 
days in return for a waiver of tort liability. 17° Forty-eight states 
in the United States have adopted this approach for serious high 
school athletic injuries, entailing cases where actual medical ex-
penses and wage loss exceed $25,000.171 The scheme, commenc-
ing with the academic year 1983-84, now operates under the aus-
pices of the National Federation of State High School Athletic 
Associations.172 To date, of fifty-nine seriously injured athletes, 
fifty-four have accepted no-fault benefits and concomitantly 
waived their tort rights. 
We admit to a reservation about the universal feasibility of 
the scheme suggested. When one moves beyond accidents with 
relatively simple causation or from manifestly dangerous activ-
ity, such as automobile and most workplace accidents, difficul-
ties loom large in defining the insured event. For example, inju-
ries arising from consumer products, medical treatment, or toxic 
substances present such problems. Under a no-fault automobile 
insurance policy, the motorist is compensated for injuries "aris-
ing out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a mo-
tor vehicle."173 But to compensate any patient "for conditions 
arising in the course of medical treatment" or to compensate any 
consumer "for injuries arising from the use of a product" is not 
similarly feasible. In medical malpractice cases, for instance, dif-
ficulty arises from having to determine whether the patient was 
168. See, e.g., Luntz, Compensation of Injuries Due to Sport, 54 AusTL. L.J. 588 
(1980). 
169. J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, supra note 16, at 137. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 137-38. 
172. A similar plan formulated by O'Connell covering claims for injuries from electric 
current provided by public utilities has been implemented. 
173. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 500.3105 (1979). 
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injured in the course of treatment or whether she suffers from 
the condition for which she went to the health care provider in 
the first place. After all, the health care provider can hardly be 
asked to pay every patient whose condition declines after treat-
ment.17• Similarly, with respect to products it seems unrealistic 
to ask a publisher or bookseller to compensate anyone injured 
by tripping over a book.1711 To tax the creation of all risk is im-
prudent social policy.176 
Nevertheless, the difficulties posed under the suggested 
scheme in defining the insurable event are not insuperable. 
Granted all the difficulties of turning back to legislation, a mod-
est legislative intervention will overcome the scheme's 
difficulties.177 
C. An Elective Legislative Scheme 
Under the latest version of an elective legislative reform, a 
provider of goods or services facing a personal injury claim 
would have the option of offering a claimant within, say, a maxi-
mum of 180 days, periodic payment of the claimant's net eco-
nomic loss. That would be prompt payment compared to what 
the tort system offers. Such payment would cover any further 
medical expenses, including rehabilitation and wage loss, not al-
ready covered by any other health or disability insurance paya-
ble to the claimant. It would also call for a reasonable hourly fee 
174. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: A Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
87 (recommending express contractual allocations of risks, within limits). In a recent 
article, Epstein opines that no-fault compensation schemes covering all adverse results of 
medical treatment are ill-advised. Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 8 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1139, 1156 (1987); see also Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of 
Medical Malpractice Risks Between Patients and Providers, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. 
PROBS., Spring 1986, at 173 (adopting an express contract model). But cf. VA. CooE ANN. 
§§ 38.2-5000-.2-5021 (Supp. 1988) (providing for a no-fault compensation system for 
birth-related neurological injuries); Atiyah, Medical Malpractice and the Contract/Tort 
Boundary, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 287 (stating that the contract 
model offers a dubious reform). 
175. See generally Henderson, The Boundary Problems of Enterprise Liability, 41 
Mo. L. REV. 659 (1982). 
176. See M. DouGLAS & A. WILAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN EssAY ON THE SELECTION 
OF TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982); Wilavsky, No Risk is the Highest 
Risk of All, 67 AM. SCIENTIST 32 (1979). 
177. See generally H.R. 5400, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 2553 (1984); 
Moore & O'Connell, Foreclosing Medical Malpractice Claims by Prompt Tender of Eco-
nomic Loss, 44 LA. L. REV. 1267 (1984); O'Connell, Offers that Can't be Refused: Foreclo-
sure of Personal Injury Claims by Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Eco-
nomic Losses, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 589, 627-29 (1982). 
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for the claimant's lawyer. These benefits are lavish compared to 
those under most health insurance policies in the United States; 
few health insurance policies, for example, cover costs of 
rehabilitation. 
The new laws would also provide that, though the claimant 
has a choice of whether or not to accept an offer, if the claimant 
rejects the offer, he may go to court only subject to certain re-
strictions. These restrictions may include: 
(1) the prescription of a more stringent standard of proof than 
the usual civil standard of preponderance of the evidence;178 
(2) the specific authorization of the defendant to offer to fi-
nance a second opinion from another lawyer, who cannot be the 
plaintiff's trial counsel and who cannot have any financial inter-
est in the plaintiff's case, as to whether rejecting the defendant's 
early offer is in the plaintiff's interest;179 
(3) the allowance of recovery of noneconomic losses only if the 
plaintiff establishes a "substantial" amount of such damages. 
This restriction would limit rejections of the offer to cases where 
noneconomic loss, including any punitive damages awarded, ex-
ceeds the plaintiff's economic loss. A formula could define "sub-
stantial." For instance, a plaintiff could collect noneconomic 
damages only if they were at least four times greater than his 
economic loss;180 and 
(4) if the plaintiff does not prevail in the subsequent litiga-
tion, the requirement that the plaintiff pay the defendant's 
costs, including legal fees, incurred after rejection of the offer, 
with the plaintiff's counsel who brought the action jointly and 
severally liable for this obligation.181 
In contrast to other proposals for tort reform, this approach 
strikes a fair balance by requiring that the defendant provide 
something in exchange for its stronger shield against liability 
and, as a corollary, that the claimant receive something in ex-
change for giving up the opportunity to pursue litigation. The 
proposal thereby preserves the tort rights of those victims who 
do not receive the benefit of an offer of settlement. Only a victim 
rejecting the offer of payment of net economic loss, properly 
178. O'Connell, Jury Trials in Civil Cases?, 58 ILL. B.J. 796, 807-08 (1970). 
179. O'Connell, supra note 160, at 909-10. 
180. The risk of this approach, of course, is that it might be an incentive for a jury to 
increase its findings of the amount of noneconomic loss in order to render effective its 
award. 
181. For the initial presentation of the latest version of the "early offers" plan, see 
O'Connell, Balanced Proposals for Product Liability Reforms, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 317 
(1987). 
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deemed by society as fair compensation in the typical case, is 
restricted with respect to the amount or manner of recovery. 
All the elective no-fault schemes discussed above have the ad-
vantage of exposing actors to an internalization of the cost of 
their activities. If they engage in dangerous activities, they will 
face the prospect of larger insurance premiums than safe opera-
tors will face. A properly functioning insurance market, within 
limits imposed by the costs of pooling risks and information, will 
police changes in accident rates. Here lies a distinct relative ad-
vantage over the administrative rate-setting under the New 
South Wales, South Australian, and Victorian legislation. Rate-
setting under the elective no-fault scheme would be governed by 
usual commercial and actuarial considerations. These considera-
tions, however, rank with political exigencies in administrative 
rate-setting. Although deterrence through the market system 
may never be finely calibrated, it provides a viable alternative to 
the straitjacket of administrative discretion. Elective no-fault 
proposals leave in place one of the common law's greatest advan-
tages-its capacity to generate information about accident-pro-
ducing activities as they develop and change over time. 
Compensation law, however, seeks to achieve other meaningful 
objectives not as elusive as deterrence, including administrative 
efficiency and loss distribution. No-fault achieves administrative 
efficiency because it reduces payment to lawyers, adjusters, and 
other third parties in the system. It achieves loss distribution 
because it leaves fewer accident victims and their families with-
out resources. If we seek an acceptable amalgam of these goals, 
together with felt needs for individual recourse, elective no-fault 
has much to commend it. We claim no nirvana. But elective no-
fault may constitute improvement over the present mayhem182 
in the American tort system and a less bureaucratic road for 
Australian endeavors. 
CONCLUSION 
We have examined various contemporary strategies for ad-
dressing the torts crisis. These reforms, as they are normally 
called, each spawn their own set of problems. The prevalent 
American ad hoc phenomenon of tort reform has a capacity to 
182. See Langbein, Comparative Civil Procedure and the Style of Complex Con-
tracts, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (1987) (describing the impact of the complex and unpre-
dictable American litigation process on commercial contracting). 
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work great harm to those most deserving of relief and succor. 
Yet this mode of reform is the most politically acceptable and 
appealing in the United States.183 
Australian experience exhibits a willingness to contemplate 
broad systemic and systematic reform. But the actuality brought 
about primarily by political compromise, when all interests are 
aggressively represented, is far from the ideal. Admittedly, no-
fault schemes contain flaws. Faith in the administrative process 
may open up decision-making to political considerations detri-
mental to accident victims. From a social welfare viewpoint, 
these schemes may palliate without confronting deeper problems 
such as wealth loss arising from illness and safety in the work-
place and on the road. '• 
It is imperative to move beyond the present reforms. We sug-
gest that both American and Australian tort systems adopt elec-
tive no-fault either through contract or legislation.184 
Our suggestions treat accident victims more equitably and re-
lieve defendants of the worst absurdities of the common law. At 
the same time, they preserve the market incentive advantages of 
a decentralized system. They also are flexible enough to serve 
the needs of a dynamic society. 
We cannot achieve perfect implementation of Robert Keeton's 
desiderata through any institutions run by humans.1811 But we 
should strive to develop schemes that in practical terms will, as 
closely as possible, fulfill these ends. The possibilities for change 
are abundant, models for reform numerous, interests at play 
contentious, and risks of taking incorrect turns significant. Kant 
taught us that the "ought" implies "can":186 We must temper 
our judgments about what ought to be done by knowledge of 
183. See supra note 21. For a discussion of the differing approaches of encouraging 
early offers by defendants and on the coordination of such contractual and statutory 
approaches, see O'Connell, Neo-No-Fault Remedies for Medical Injuries: Coordinated 
Statutory and Contractual Alternatives, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 
125. 
184. It may indeed be imperative for reformers to provide no-fault benefits in order 
to preserve tort reform from constitutional law attack. See Fein v. Permanente Medical 
Group, 474 U.S. 892, dismissing appeal from 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 
368 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that a substantial federal question was 
presented in the challenge to California's tort reform legislation on the issue of whether a 
compensation scheme should be enacted as a quid pro quo for the replacement of com-
mon-law or state-law remedies). For an informative summary of the constitutional issues 
see Smith, Medicine and Law: AIDS, Constitutional Challenges to Tort Reform and 
Medical Malpractice, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 370 (1988); see also Leavitt, Liability Insur-
ance Crisis: The Regulatory Response, 91 DICK. L. REV. 919 (1987). 
185. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
186. See I. KANT, ON THE OLD SAW: THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY BuT IT WoN'T 
WORK IN PRACTICE (E. Ashton trans. 1974). 
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what it is possible to do. Tort reform therefore should be in-
formed by sensitive comparative work that weighs political pos-
sibilities and prudent policies. If we can share the technical se-
cret of the winged keel on "Australia II," the victorious yacht in 
the 1982 America's Cup, we also can benefit from our compara-
tive efforts to improve the lot of the accident victim. 

